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Depressions: Their Causes and Treatment

[Continued from Vol. 2, No. 6, p 341.]

By Dr. Wilhelm Stekel, Vienna.

All sufferers from neurotic depression have a decided "will to be sick"; i.e., they do not wish to get well. They are pronouncedly distracted souls consisting of two or three personalities. One of these wants to get well, clings to life, listens to the Doctor's every word, anxiously watches his facial expression to see whether he contradicts him and how if he speaks of the hopelessness of his malady. But the other does not want to get well; he suffers from a grave feeling of guilt.

A feeling of guilt is the central point in the whole neurosis and in the melancholic psychosis. This feeling emanates from a secret consciousness of guilt. That is why all sufferers from depression are reproaching themselves. But these reproaches refer to the underlying guilt only in a masked form. Only the analysis uncovers the deeper motives of the guilty consciousness and shows what reproaches consciousness passes by in order to pounce upon others which may serve as substitutes. We may, therefore, in these cases speak of "substitute guilt" and "substitute reproaches".

Let us return to our patient. His reproaches relate to repeated marital infidelity which resulted in luetic infection and a consequent fear of paralysis. His wife is sick, temperamental,—in short, there is no spiritual intimacy between them. Physical relations were given up long ago because of a "woman's disease." He has decided wishes for her death or of being rid of her,—and these alone might be sufficient causes for his depression and his feelings of guilt. Moreover, his wife had discovered an "affair" between him and a niece which lasted almost up to the outbreak of his depression. The malady was precipitated by a demotion in his job and humiliation by a superior. He stopped going to his office which had offered him considerable diversion. But this diversion had permitted him to cover up and sublimate his sexual urges. Now everything in him was set free. But what did he do? He severed his relations to his niece and began to live a life of abstinence—because he feared an attack of heart failure during coitus. He feared God's vengeance for his sinful life. He wanted to re-

form and devote himself to his family. Among his children his oldest daughter was the idol of his heart (the niece was a daughter-imago!). This girl became engaged and began to neglect him,—she on whom he had set all his hopes. She had discovered his affair with the niece, was jealous, and turned her back on him. With this engagement his dejection began and just before her marriage his depressions broke out. Analysis resulted in a relatively quick cure. All drugs were discontinued at first. Soon thereafter his bowels began to move without the aid of laxatives and he was able to sleep without taking hypnotics; he became quite active, learned daily to be up and about for several hours, began to take an interest in attending lectures and sought out another way of earning his living, a business that gave him a larger measure of independence.

Wishes for the death of beloved kindred frequently occur in the psychogenesis of depressions because these are the results of unhappy love. I could cite a dozen such cases from my own experience. An elderly man falls in love with his stenographer; he does not acknowledge this to himself; it continues as an unconscious love; he begins to suffer from heart disease. (See my pamphlet on 'the nervous heart'.) At the same time he begins to worry about his wife, she is so careless that she might be run over, etc. Behind this neurotic fear is concealed his criminal desire. He becomes afflicted with intense depression. Analysis discovers the repressed love.

Incestuous desires which had been repressed may frequently be predicated.

Not infrequently, as in the aforementioned case, another person stands for the beloved. Often the invalid flees from the incest into a new love. In serious psychoses these incest desires manifest themselves openly. And in that case the invalids accuse themselves of incestuous relations and ask to be severely punished. Or they project their desires outward and accuse others of trying to involve them in incest, and begin to hate some member of their family violently and certain near relatives are not permitted to come near them. Occasionally the whole family becomes the object of his or her hate.

One of the chief causes of depression is the termination of a secret incestuous hope. Mothers become ill when their children get married; fathers likewise. But daughters too may become afflicted with depressions before their marriage to the man they love if they are "fixed" on some member of their family.

I could cite many examples from my experience. But I do not want to tire my reader, as I have much more to tell. Everyone can confirm my conclusions from his own observations.

The termination of an unconscious incestuous relationship may be found in almost every depression. Most frequently the (unconscious) love object has formed an attachment with someone else. This love is then regarded as an act of faithlessness.

Parents often object to their children's attachments and find all sorts of forced and untrue motives for their objections. Usually they charge the children with neglect and with no longer loving them.

After marriages one often sees mild manic states in the near kindred which represent a flight into intended merri-ment and exaggerated activity which are then followed by a depression which can easily result in a mistaken diagnosis of cyclothymia.

In the case last cited, my patient complained that his daughter had no comprehension of the seriousness of his sufferings. She laughed at him and quoted his physicians to the effect that no one dies from depression. Like all invalids, he wants to enforce love in the shape of sympathy. He becomes an egoist and ceases to love.

He does not love himself even, as we are told by Freud, who sees in melancholia a "narcistic psychosis", i.e., a turning back of the libido upon one's own ego. One must, on the contrary, see in melancholia and in depression a reversal phenomenon. All the "disposition to love" is transformed into a "disposition to hate". The patient can only hate and he hates himself. This hatred of oneself may amount to a weariness of life. He tortures himself, mutilates himself, lays violent hands on himself. Most frequently he complains of having no feelings, of being emotionally dead, of having a heart like stone, etc. This only shows that the invalid is thoroughly dominated by hatred. He can't love because he hates himself and the whole world. That is why he tortures those about him, gives them no rest by night or day, tyrannizes over them. He resents being removed to a sanitarium because then he can no longer torture his kindred. He is envious of

everybody. He envies everyone who can eat or laugh or sleep or be happy.

Depression is a neurosis of hate. The patients often think that they are depressed because they hate. But the truth is just the reverse. They hate because they are depressed. We see women who are depressed because they hate their children, women who attribute their depression to their hatred of their husbands. In all cases the malady begins with a disturbance in the love relationship. The more profound the depression gets the more pronouncedly the hatred of the environment manifests itself. Assaults may follow. Other examples will show us that this hatred goes back to other causes.

In the psychic structure of depression there is always a nucleus which I regard as the driving wish or as the "unfulfilled wish." Every wish and every fantasy has a certain claim on reality (to be realized). I call this "the reality coefficient". If this coefficient gets down to zero, so that the hope of the fulfillment of the unfulfilled longing gets down to zero, we have the psychological factor for the outbreak of a depression. Inasmuch as this "unfulfilled wish" is usually unconscious, the cause for the depression is also outside of the field of vision of consciousness. The depression therefore represents the final triumph of reality over fantasy. It means the utter bankruptcy of the fantasy realm. The neurotic operates with two tools: the pleasure-principle and the reality-principle (Freud). In the depression the pleasure standard is wholly discarded. But the reality standard also

suffers depreciation. The invalid depreciates the whole world, all his possessions,—everything loses its value. All this means: nothing can give him pleasure!

With the bankruptcy of his fantasies and the bitter recognition of the unfulfillableness of his unconscious aims there comes about a diminution in his interests. Interest and attention are problems of affectivity (Bleuler). The patient's whole affectivity is transformed into hatred. Therewith his mental horizon confines itself to objects of hate (his immediate environment). Finally he has only one object of interest: his own ego and his unhappiness. The old observation that unhappiness makes one egoistic is thus confirmed anew. Freud thinks that the libido flows back on the ego. Only in a certain sense and with some modification is this assumption true. It would only have to be proved that it is a matter of libidodisturbance, that the interference with an object-endowment results in a fixation on the ego, i.e., to a regression in the infantile sense.

But it is certain that a restriction of the sphere of interest is the essential trait of this neurosis. As soon as the invalid begins to take an interest in his environment and in the affairs of the world we have the first sign of progress. Also if he complains of utter indifference. After a period of hatred he must pass through a period of indifference before he can love again. He is cured when he loves again.

All observers have noted the invalid's tendency to weep and wail. In the

milder stages they talk incessantly and occupy themselves with their sufferings. Only in the more serious stages do they reproach themselves. But there is no depression in which the patient does not reproach himself. When he is silent and ceases to complain he is thinking of his shortcomings. He searches his whole past to discover the sins for which he is being punished. The malady is regarded as just punishment by God. He becomes very pious or ceases to be pious (because there is no God, or He would not let me suffer like this"). Inwardly they are all pious, even though they are free-thinkers or atheists. They admit that they try to pray, but in vain. They hate God just as they hate everything else. The malady is often ushered in with some blasphemy or revolt against God. Depressions which broke out during the war, after the death of a beloved at the front, often showed this resentment against God.

A woman who had been suffering from melancholia for three years came to me for treatment. I was told during the analysis that she had formerly been pious but was now wholly without any faith. She had been in the habit of going to confession monthly and had gone to church regularly. The reason for this change in her she found in the fact that she had so unjustly been afflicted with this malady. Analysis brought to light that she had fallen in love with a cousin and had bravely conquered this love. She begged this cousin to leave her house as she was determined not to be unfaithful to her "dear husband" (who satisfied her neither physically nor spiritual-

ly). After his departure she went to church. As she was praying it chanced that she had to pass flatus and she expelled it with a curse against God. After that she did not dare to go to church again, for she thought herself a horrible sinner. She also feared to go to confession. I recommended that she go to a certain confessor whom I had instructed. He absolved her and she was quickly cured.

I have mentioned it that all these invalids incline to wailing. They enforce love from their environment in the shape of sympathy, and they are furious if their sufferings and complainings are not taken seriously. If they laugh at anything they at once seek to nullify it by saying it wasn't genuine laughter, it was mechanical, artificial. And at once they begin to wail again.

What we have thus far said has brought us nearer to an understanding of many of the symptoms. The patients' reproaches are justified. Their guilty conscience gives them no rest. Their malady is a self-imposed punishment. That is why they do not believe they can ever get well. They don't want to get well! That is why they laugh superiorly when the physician says they will be cured. They know better; they are incurable. Their suicide is the penalty for having desired someone's death. I once formulated this proposition: no one kills himself who has not wished to kill another! This is true also of the suicides which often terminate depression.

In an interesting essay on 'melancholia and grief' Freud asserted that the reproach originally appertained to a be-

loved person and was only secondarily transferred upon the sufferer's ego. This assertion is, according to my experience, not true of all cases. It is true only of a certain type. But it is utterly wrong to see in the patient's rejection of food something other than "chronic suicide." Freud italicises Abraham's assertion that the rejection of food is a sequel to a "repression in the cannibalistic phase of the evolution of the libido." I have no relish for such sophistries and highfalutin' notions. They darken the clinical picture instead of illuminating it.

. . . .

The patients grow poor in love. The fear of becoming poor means to grow poor in love. In the language of depression gold means love. They don't want to spend any money, don't want to buy anything,—nothing is worth anything. They find the environment and the physician to be perfectly heartless. No one suffers as much as they do. Has the Doctor ever treated such a severe case as this? Can he feel how sick they are? They watch his every word and develop a wonderful genius for distorting his words and interpreting them adversely. They are very sensitive and develop an uncanny power for observing every gesture and every peculiar inflection of the voice in the physician or in the environment. They have lost interest in the world but they have become more acute in all matters relating to their ego.

The whole clinical picture is pervaded with a masochistic tendency. Their hatred is directed upon their own ego and from their self-torture they derive a secret delight. This is especially

noticeable in those cases in which the clinical picture approaches that of hypochondria. Hypochondria always attacks an "erogenous" zone. To superficial observation these erogenous zones look like fear-accumulators, but in reality they are pleasure accumulators.

Now I come to the most important part of my thesis. Men suffering from this malady give an impression of femininity; so that Mendel could rightly speak of a *climacterium virile*. (Neurol. Zbl., 1910.) In woman's critical age we are dealing with a bankruptcy of all erotic hopes. The man is old, feels old, and complains that he is now to die although he had not yet satisfied his inclinations (exhausted his vital powers). In every one there lives a secret "sexual imperative" which drives us on to seek for fulfillment. Without this fulfillment we cannot die or we die with the complaint of not having really lived.

But in man's *climacterium* his effeminization becomes clearly manifest. He loses all his energy, becomes incapable of making decisions ("like an old woman"), complains openly that he has lost his masculinity. (See Loewenfeld's "Sexualleben und Nervenleiden," 4th edition, 1914; chapter on "*Climacterium virile*".)

It is an indisputable fact, which I have observed again and again, that depressions begin with an augmentation of the homosexual component. Men become feminine and women become masculine. I cannot decide how much of this is due to disturbances in the internal secretions. The results obtained by psychotherapy speak against a purely organic basis. In

all probability there is a refuge in homosexuality owing to a disappointing heterosexuality.

Women afflicted with depressions, who almost always present a picture of melancholia, suddenly manifest a tendency to masculine occupations. They begin to smoke because the cigarette has the soothing effect of a narcotic. They wear men's shirts and collars. Some now bob their hair, apparently for no reason. They covet the quiet of out-doors in the country and wear trousers. Now and then a strong growth of hair on the face becomes noticeable during the depression. The menses become more scanty or stay away altogether. The thyroid gland enlarges and disturbances in the internal secretions are manifest. The whole organism participates in the transformation into the opposite sex.

This change from the heterosexual to the homosexual is conspicuous in periodic depressions. In his extremely interesting and fundamental work on 'the puberty glands and hermaphroditism', Steinach points out that masculine and feminine periods alternated in his artificial hermaphrodites.

Steinach refers to the investigations made by Moll, who was the first to establish the fact of a periodicity in the manifestation of a homosexual tendency. But hints of this are to be found also in the writings of Krafft-Ebing, Tarnowsky, Hirschfeld and Bloch.—Krafft-Ebing described a case of periodic bisexuality which ran a course such as I have had chances to observe. Homosexual tendencies during depression which necessitated confinement in a sanitarium.

There she made love to the physicians and even went so far as to propose marriage to them. As her neurosis improved, the heterosexual impulse became more and more marked. Krafft-Ebing observed an attack (hysterical psychosis) in which these two tendencies wrestled with each other; he cured the patient by suggestion.

In his book on homosexuality, Hirschfeld mentions a case of periodic bisexuality which was ushered in with symptoms of cyclothymia. He says: "The patient was a university professor who was suffering from manic-depressive insanity with alternating moods and who had become a morphine addict while in a sanitarium. During his depressions he is homosexual, during his exaltation period and when under the influence of morphine he is heterosexual. The remarkable thing about it all is the fact that in his homosexual period his voice is high-pitched, breaks often, and his gait is downright womanish; whereas in his heterosexual periods his voice is deeper and his gait and gestures are more virile." Lowenfeld also describes a case of a periodic compulsion to homosexuality combined with a change of voice.

I have observed the same thing in all my cases. Depression sets in with the outbreak of the homosexual tendency.

Max Marcuse describes a case of periodic-alternating hetero and homosexuality which took the very opposite course, completely at variance with my findings. The invalid was an author, a man of 31, with a bad heredity, who felt well and able to write and create only when he was homosexual, whereas

in his normal heterosexual periods he was depressed and unable to write. There was no physical evidence of bisexuality. During his homosexual periods he lives, as a man, with a young male friend, and his happiness is marred only by an almost constant fear of police interference; at first he was evidently made miserable by blackmailers. It is during these periods that he writes and sells his poems. Then suddenly, almost over night, but not without premonitions of a change, there comes a transformation: his happiness changes to dejection and he is unable to write; not infrequently he has to resist a desire to commit suicide, and he fears that some day he will yield to the impulse. At such times he cannot understand how he could ever have been homosexual, inasmuch as now the mere thought of it disgusts him; he flees from his homosexual friends and from the environment as a whole by running away on a trip—somewhere, anywhere, where chance and a blind urge may take him. He longs for the embraces of a woman, is very responsive to feminine charms and falls in love with almost every good-looking woman he sees. Coitus has little charm for him and seldom satisfies him. During this period he is wholly unstable, debauched, wastes his money—because "nothing matters"—and lives "without rime or reason."

We see then that he suffers also during his homosexual periods. He is always in fear of a conflict with the police and is exposed to blackmailers. Of course it is possible that "the will to homosexuality", which I find in all

cases of homosexuality, has altered the type of the depression. In my book on 'onanism and homosexuality' I pointed out the connection between this condition and sadism. The homosexual hates women and flees from his criminal sadism into homosexual love. I observed a very instructive case in which profound depression occurred for which the patient could not account. But during these attacks he hated the whole world and especially his mother, so that he was afraid of himself.

Many persons resort to morphine and to other narcotics as an escape from their sadism. One man who took from 20 to 30 grains of opium per diem told me he had to do that "to be good". He caricatured love of kindred, so that it was clear that he was compensating for sadism. He made only one exception. He hated homosexuals although in all other respects his world philosophy was wholly anarchistic. He used to say: "Homosexuals I'd be content to burn in a pile or to have them hanged." It was clear that he wished to drown his own homosexual component in opium. This phenomenon is explicable if we bear in mind the fact, as shown by my analyses, that periodic dipsomania is attributable to a periodic recurrence of homosexuality.. In one homosexual dipsomaniac I was satisfied that in the alcohol the outbreak of the heterosexual tendency was condemned to inactivity. (On the other hand, in so-called normals we see a homosexual tendency manifest itself when the individual is drunk.)

There are cases, however, which clearly show a combination of homosexuality

with sadism. The following case illustrates this: A woman of 34, the wife of a physician, was referred to me by Prof. Eppinger for analysis. She comes from a healthy family, is of the infantile type, but has a striking growth of hair on the chin which gives her the appearance, when seen in profile, of a pale young man. Menses regular. Ever since her marriage she suffers from periodic attacks of severe depression which last from two to three months. Though she is usually of a gentle and calm demeanor and affectionate to her husband, during her attacks she is wild and tempestuous. Notwithstanding the most solemn resolutions not to do so, she beats her husband. She is frigid and cannot be brought to the point of orgasm. During her depression she becomes nymphomaniacal, craves for coitus again and again, gets violently excited, but gets no orgasm. She reproaches her husband with having weakened himself prior to their marriage. She had prevailed on him to tell her of his ante-marital sexual experiences and is suffering from that ruinous "jealousy of the past" which makes a hell of all marriages.

I base my theory of homosexuality on this coincidence of jealousy, sadism and homosexuality. Here I shall only repeat what I say in my book on 'onanism': jealousy rests on a homosexual basis. One is (pathologically) jealous only if one finds the persons of whom one is jealous desirable. But for this there must be a homosexual predisposition. Jealousy is also a subterfuge for hatred which is thus rationalised. The depression is determined by hatred, the driving

power of sadism. It is an out-spoken hatred-neurosis.

Of particular interest are the relations between depression and delusions, especially hermaphroditism. The first case of the kind that came under my observation was certainly remarkable. A peasant woman of 42 was discovered to be a man during a urologic examination. By means of an operation he was provided with a penis which enabled him to urinate perfectly. Men's clothing was also given him (till then he had been employed as a maid on a farm.) The operation was followed by depression which lasted three months.

The precipitating factor in this man's depression was evidently the idea, "You are no longer a woman." And this, I think, is a reaction to a hopeless sexual craving.

As Freud's celebrated study has shown (in his 'psychoanalytic comments on an autobiographic description of a case of paranoia') paranoia may be traced back to repressed homosexuality. I was able to confirm this in all my cases. (See my book on 'onanism', etc.) But there occur delusions in which the patient imagines himself an hermaphrodite. We must look on this delusion as an attempt at a cure, as a compromise in the insoluble conflict: "Am I male or female?"

Very interesting in this connection is the case described by Kielholtz in his pathographic study of Jacob Boehme (1919). A girl had committed matricide (!) and was confined in the asylum as a case of circular insanity. She described her condition as follows: "I

had to pass through various stages; one was very definite and permitted of no doubt; the other was an undefined neutral stage which was full of doubts about the correctness of this existence. I recall the moment in which the change took place. I had the delusion that I had become a man. My body's movements became freer, my muscles gained in tensile power, the blood coursed through the arteries with greater vigor and thus promoted mental and bodily activity. My whole being felt lighter, more cheerful; my thinking was freer, bolder; my faculties were sharpened and I felt my capacity for work doubled. An agreeable self-consciousness raised my psychic state and banished my feeling of inferiority. I would have been very happy with this transformation if I hadn't suffered from the (imaginary) hints of the orderlies as well as of the male inmates. I therefore attempted suicide. Then came the stage in which my being was indefinite and I was beset with doubts and uncertainty. With gradual improvement these ideas disappeared as well as the feeling of maleness."

In this case we see the sadistic component (matricide!) which was transformed into genuine altruism. She wanted to cure all the patients and thought she really could do so by virtue of her hermaphroditism. "Christ is an hermaphrodite," she said,—thus clearly showing the "Christ-neurosis" as well as the "great historic mission" which I have described elsewhere.

It is curious how often persons with delusions speak of castration. Kiefeld reports the case of a man working in a

factory who thought his fellows were persecuting him. They wanted to induce him to become a waitress. They would castrate him and transplant into him the uterus of a monkey.

I observed a case of manic depressive insanity in which castration fantasies occurred during the depressions. He wanted to cut off the membrum, thinking that in that way he would get well. The castration mania of certain primitive peoples may have arisen in such homo-sexual longings (such as regularly occur in the climacterium and senium of men).

These facts solve the riddle of cyclothymia and of all periodic depressions. They are due to the periodic alternation between homo and hetero-sexuality. A strong bi-sexuality predisposes to this malady.

In the case of the Doctor's wife, previously mentioned, a nymphomaniac urge was present during her depression. This frequent phenomenon must not mislead us. As I have shown, the nymphomaniac woman, like the satirical man, is really a latent homosexual. Because the normal act fails to give gratification, there is a demand for repetition. A Don Juan is also a latent homosexual, as I have shown. The analysis of a Messalina proves an outspoken bisexuality with a strong tendency to frankly known homosexuality. That is why we shall find in depressive states, if the sexual impulse is not wholly quenched, a tendency to change the love object. Women crave to be unfaithful, men frequent the brothel. These are spasmodic attempts

at a cure, to get from homosexuality back to homosexuality.

If an old man falls in love suddenly it may also be a flight from homosexuality. The more pathological and the more improbable this love appears, the greater is the probability that we are dealing with an attempted cure, a transposition of the homosexuality upon a heterosexual object. A man of 61 fell in love with a young girl. He left his family, was divorced, although he was the grandfather of a number of children. After his marriage an attack of depression broke out. The analysis showed that he had really fallen in love with the girl's brother and had transferred this affection to her.

The question arises whether these findings may prove of therapeutic value. I want to say forthwith that treatment with hormones has proved wholly ineffective in my hands. The future alone will decide whether the Steinach operation, i.e., implantation of a gonadal gland of a person of the same sex for the purpose of intensifying the heterosexual impulses, will prove of any value. It is not impossible that some day we may have a surgical therapy for the psychoses, dipsomania, manic-depressive insanity and paranoia.

Psychotherapy gives excellent results because the patients fall passionately in love with the physician (Note Krafft-Ebing's case above), i.e., force back the homosexual tendency and improvise an actual heterosexual passion. The rejection of this only too frequently uncontrolled passion evokes a profound depression.

It requires great psychotherapeutic skill to master an attack of depression. The patients lament incessantly and hide their unconscious motives. They don't want to speak of the underlying motives of their malady. Often one is compelled to limit oneself to persuasion and amiable encouragement. But in some cases psychoanalysis leads to quick results, the patient's eyes are opened, he is free from the burdensome sense of guilt which, owing to his hatred and death-fantasies, constantly gnaws at his heart. In a subsequent and more elaborate work I shall discuss the genesis and therapy of depressions at length; for the present these hints must suffice.

But I warn against treating with narcotics those suffering from depression. In this way opium, veronal and adalin addicts are made; many of these addicts are the products of a vicious therapy. I use opium only as a temporary sedative in those cases which show constant tendencies to suicide and in which fear threatens to bring about a *raptus melancholicus*. These cases are becoming steadily rarer. I have learned to get along without narcotics or other sedatives (adalin, bromural, luminal, bromides, etc.). The following day the patients are even more sullen, more apathetic, and their *aboulia* is intensified.

I no longer fear the insomnia of depression. I have learned that in this insomnia we have a kind of attempt at a cure and a kind of protective measure. The invalids fear to sleep because they don't want to give themselves up to their pathological complexes. (See my

essay on 'the will to sleep'.) Many of these are awakened with fright and palpitation from a short nap in which they dreamt of falling into an abyss. This symbolizes their falling into the deeps of their criminal nature, into the abyss of their secret wishes During the analysis the insomnia is the first thing to improve. The frank discussion of their conflicts serves to unburden the soul and diminishes the fear of sleep and the fear of forbidden dreams.

Hydrotherapy offers us an invaluable therapeutic adjunct. It is one of our tasks to keep the invalid busy all day so that he gets no time to brood. He is averse to dwelling on the psychic roots or to feel that something unpleasant is being done to cure him. Cold packs lasting about an hour, followed by a tepid bath (to bring about a cutaneous reaction) are well borne. The pack must be real cold, say 14 degrees to 16 degrees C. The tepid bath 18 degrees to 16 degrees C. If the patient does not get warm during the pack, we rub him down first or apply hot water bags to the feet, etc.

We must endeavor to get the patients back to work and to do their work to the best of their ability, no matter how they resent this or bewail their inability. Women must not be permitted to shirk their housework. They should read light and interesting literature, go to the theatre (farces, comedies, vaudeville) keep away from the "movies" (and their overemphasis of sex motives), play cards (for small stakes), take walks, go autoing, etc.

The physician's skill will show itself in his handling of the patient during the early sessions. In addition to the psychologic investigation there must be the attempt to calm the patient and induce him to do some work. Vacations are very inadvisable; they always make the depression worse. The efficacy of sanatoria will depend on the competence of the attending physicians.

I must not conclude this study without saying something about the danger of these patients committing suicide. When I first began to practice psychotherapeutics I used to fear this danger very much. Experience has taught me that this danger is eliminated if during the treatment the patient can be made hopeful of a cure and if the physician is

not discouraged by the patient's lamentations. Suicide does not occur during psychoanalytic treatment. The patients may threaten to do so but as long as they cling to the analyst they do not carry out their threats. At any rate it is imperative to keep them busy and not to let them sit and brood. It is a good plan to begin the treatment with forbidding the patients to tell anyone their troubles. They must pour out their complaints only to the physician. This begins the school of self-education and self-control. The treatment is difficult, strenuous, fatiguing and time-consuming. But it saves many persons and leads them gently back again into life and reality.

[Translated by S. A. Tannenbaum.]

Anagogic Psychoanalysis

By Dr. Emanuel van Geijerstam, Göteborg

(Continued from 2:332.)

II.

With reference to surrogates: one which plays a most important function in the life of the human race undoubtedly is alcohol. It is significant that the Unconscious often makes use of alcohol as a symbol for the progressive trend. A male neurotic, aged 45, associates to a cryptolalia the following: "A glass of whiskey is harmful; I am for restrictions." It happens that the patient himself was a moderate consumer of alcohol, and drink had played a not insignificant rôle in his trouble. Objectively his expression was merely the statement of a teetotaler's viewpoint. The restrictions to which his statement hinted pertained subjectively to sexuality and activity in general. The patient suffered from intense feelings of inadequacy when confronted with any serious task, so that work seemed a mountain to him. He was very much afraid of over-exertion; besides, he had the notion that sexual indulgence decreases his working ability. These two points had been gone over very minutely during the previous day. Accordingly, harmful brandy is sexuality and work.

Another subject said about alcohol: "It does not taste good, but one gets over that and learns to like it." That statement referred to his activity as a

whole, to work. On another occasion this subject used oysters as a symbol for work: "I have never eaten any; I heard that at first they do not taste nice; but that after one gets accustomed to them they are very delicious", he said. Still another subject said about brandy: "I seldom take a drink, but when I do it is easy for me to take a second glass, and a third." It turned out that one cohabitation in the course of a night did not satisfy him; he wanted to repeat the act two or three times. It was hard at first, it was much easier afterwards.

Fully in harmony with the rôle of alcohol as a representative of the progressive urge stands forth the obvious fact that the drinker's plight, and his troubled conscience, do not arise from the short-lived feeling of elation brought on by the alcohol, but are the result of the impairment of the subject's usefulness as a worker which is caused by the indulgence in alcohol. One finds that the sins of omission are a powerful factor in self-reproach even among habitual drinkers. It not infrequently happens that during his state of intoxication the drinker proclaims, wide and loud, what he is going to do. One may even say that the victim of drink is talking about what he should have done. The effect of the alcohol is to remove the inhibition

to the outpouring of the libido, rendering the latter more frictionless. Therefore, during the intoxication, everything that had been neglected is miraculously carried out in phantasy, as in a dream. It is for this reason, too, that many a subject is full of strong and brilliant plans of action precisely during the alcoholic spree. Foolish statements are merely misplaced expressions referring to reality.

For the present I wish to refer again to the patient who spoke of "restrictions" as mentioned above, and to record his reactions when I examined him in connection with a cryptolalia, because it shows how variedly a patient may express his resistance and at the same time it also illustrates how efficiently analysis is able to overcome it. Instead of forming an artificial word, as I had requested him to do, the patient reacted with a real word. The patient did this obviously to avoid, in the first place, the effort of coining a new word. At the same time he proclaimed thereby his hidden determination to present a word which could not be analysed. For a real word expresses nothing but its ordinary linguistic meaning, he conjectures. But it always turns out that the real word, too, can be treated as a genuine cryptolalia. Ask the patient to split the word into its component parts and to give his associations to each part and you will find that, like a cryptolalia, that word contains, is made up of, word particles which represent certain latent thoughts.

Precisely that is what happened in the case mentioned above. Later the subject formulated what I took to be a gen-

uine cryptolalia. After the analysis of that term the subject asked very naively: "Do you really think, doctor, that I have made up that word?" He showed plainly that he thought analysis was a joke because it was not a word of his own coining. From that we can see how strong the subject's inclination was to belittle the consultant. And, I may add, that he was a very fine and honorable gentleman, a person with whom my past relations had been such that he always showed the best of good will towards me. But it was easy to explain to him that the validity of psychoanalysis is rather strengthened by the proof that, although he had failed to follow the instructions given him, twice in succession he had brought forth analysable material.

His second word was a Russian term and he naturally thought that he could receive me and pass the word as a cryptolalia. It turned out that the first letters formed the first part of his wife's name, and not only had he passionately loved his wife but he still loved her. The last three letters were the initials of one of his best friends. The Russian word signified, approximately, "that is good"; it was supposed to represent my interlocutor's attitude or standpoint, but in reality it bore a meaning which stood for the exact opposite of his intended disavowal. The first letters of the Swedish equivalent word were the same as in Russian.

While relating a dream this patient was uncertain whether his report was accurate. Freud points out this doubt or uncertainty is evoked by the resistance

which would not permit the dream-thought to rise into consciousness. Elsewhere Freud states that any reflection which comes up in the course of relating a dream usually belongs to the dream material, i. e., it should be treated as an association.

When this patient, on the occasion of his second appointment with me, began relating his dream with such expressions as the following: "I am strongly moved to relate to you every part of the dream precisely as I remember it", or, "I shall try not to add to my account of the dream any after thoughts", this was due partly to his resistance; but in part these expressions served also as the precise opposite of his attitude during the previous day's appointment, when he related the account of his trouble with the fear he was not giving an accurate report of some particular detail here and there,—a peculiarity of behavior which is in itself symptomatic. He carried his uncertainty so far as to even doubt whether the dream was an actual construction of his own psyche.

Another, or more correctly speaking, a couple of additional examples, will richly illustrate the patient's unwillingness to have his own material subjected to analytic interpretation. Two patients, each suffering from impotentia, formed certain cryptolalias which included the syllables "impot." Neither subject had any fore-knowledge of the associations to which this term might lead. In this connection it may be interesting to point out that resistance during psychoanalysis and in hypnotherapy manifests itself in numerous ways. A common, well recog-

nized manifestation for resistance during psychoanalysis, is for the patient to maintain that no associations occur to him,— "his mind is a blank." In hypnotherapy the patient states his mind is full of so many thoughts that he is unable to trace any particular chain of associations.

A reflection which probably most persons have made upon waking from some dream. At least on one occasion I have been able to ascertain that this was due to the fact that the circumstances in question had been contemplated with distinct satisfaction by the dreamer during the previous day; that a certain occurrence took a different course than he had expected. Whether this is always the case I am unable to state.

We have seen that there exists a parallel between sexual interests and other interests and that the sexual dream pictures are partly literal but they also bear, in part, an anagogic meaning. The Freudian school, as is well known, speaks of the sexual-libidinous endowments of the non-sexual psychisms. Very striking are the numerous parallels in our mental life. A young public school teacher was in love with a girl but did not dare confess his love to her because she belonged to a well-to-do family; he was poor. During his normal training course he always thought that his colleagues were better prepared than he. He had sexual intercourse with a woman but without feeling any deep affection for her; he experienced no orgasm. He reproached himself for the illicit relations and developed various neurotic symptoms. When it became necessary for him to undertake some extra work he found it

very irksome. That, too, led to various additional neurotic symptoms; naturally he thought his condition was due to over-exertion, whereas his trouble was that he was doing work in which he took no pleasure.

The question rises: is there a sharp line of cleavage between sexual craving and true craving for activity? We must note that we possess no definite criterion whether a given manifestation of energy is sexual in character or not. This is a fact clearly pointed out also by Freud. It is hopeless to attempt to trace a sharp line between friendship and erotism. But are there transitional stages between the sexual craving and the craving for activity? This is a question which I do not consider myself prepared to answer. But I would like to point out a few important considerations bearing on the theme.

It is a well known fact that in the presence of imminent danger fear may induce sexual excitation and even bring on a pollution. In 1902 I published in *Hygeia* the report of a case which I classified as an anxiety neurosis in Freud's sense; in this case the anxiety attacks were controlled by masturbatory acts. Hitschmann (Freud's "Theory of the Neuroses") states that the concentration of the attention upon intellectual pursuits may bring on sexual excitation in young men and many adults. He considers this the true cause of the nervous disorders alleged to be due to "over-exertion", a conclusion which I consider somewhat over-hasty. At any rate we are growing convinced that there is no such disorder as a true over-

exertion neurosis, i.e., a so-called exogenous, "genuine" neurasthenia, without the involvement of the affects, is extremely rare. (I personally have never met a case.) Symptoms of over-exertion, of course, are common enough, but these disappear after a period of rest. But mental over-exertion, when the symptoms are not relieved by rest, in my judgment shows that the condition is not due to overwork, but to absence of a proper enjoyment-attitude towards work. I am not unfamiliar with the theory, spoken of by Hitschman, that sexual excitation, as an accompaniment of intellectual activity, is precisely the form under which the repressed pleasure-attitude breaks forth. The sexual craving appears as a substitute for the lost pleasure in work,—as a more pleasant and more convenient form of the latter. But that theory, at best, is merely speculative. I cannot regard sexual excitation without some adequate objective as a cause for symptoms of strain. I regard these symptoms as indicative of a loss of the pleasure which ordinarily accompanies activity. Moreover I do not believe that such cases occur as frequently as Hitschmann assumes. Pollutions during sleep unaccompanied by any sexual dreams are not uncommon. I recall a patient who had pollutions while dreaming of being engaged in solving mathematical problems. Another young student sometimes had pollutions while dreaming of walking up and down some steps. Climbing stairways, according to Freud, is a common sexual symbol, and refers to the sexual act. I had occasion to

analyze such a dream. The stairway was the University hall,—the course of study. That stairway led to the dissection room, clearly an over-determination, for the dreamer hated dissection. His chief symptom was a compulsory preoccupation with everything that he had to do. While this habit represents the maximum of control, his dream (through the pollution) shows also that he exercises this self-control in a very strict form. That is the exact opposite of the feeling-attitude characteristic of the compulsion neurotic who, like every other type of neurotic, resists his symptoms.

It happened also that the patient felt particularly well during the day following the dream.

Masturbation often accompanied his efforts at study.

The patient referred to above who dreamed of mathematics was an advanced "sexual neurasthenic"; his potentia was much reduced and he also displayed a strong activity dysphoria. The first act of masturbation, so far as he can recall, this subject indulged in at 7 or 8 years of age, at a time when he was confronted with a school task which he found extremely irksome. There are also instances when great satisfaction with intellectual accomplishments leads to an irradiation upon the sexual realm. I am acquainted with an eminent biologist who told me that whenever he finds under his microscope something that he knows no other human being has seen before he feels overwhelmed by a sensuous impulse.

A young neurotic, (impotentia, ejaculatio ante portam), engaged in business for himself, told me that when the sales are brisk he is likely to experience ejaculatio. That happened especially if he was on a journey and his attention was not engrossed in work. If he could think with satisfaction back to some recent business exploit he experienced an irradiation upon the genital sphere. As a consequence he was in the habit of combining his sexual pleasure and interest in work. Moreover the same patient exhibited a number of fairly typical compulsive symptoms. He had the mannerism of bending his head sideways to bend the edge of the collar, as if the collar were too high in the neck. That symptom was a symbolic representation of the underlying abstract feeling-attitude. It epitomized his fear of erotic phantasies,—the fear of erectio. He was in the habit of repressing the physical fact itself with all sorts of preventive measures, such as cold water packs, etc., but usually he was worse off in the end. The symptomatic mannerism, consequently, was an abbreviated sexual deed,—an unconscious act of onanism. Unwilling to obey his libidinous impulse, the latter expressed itself in the form of the mannerism just mentioned.

He also had a tendency to break out with involuntary laughter on uncalled for, earnest occasions. That tendency is traceable to the same cause; at bottom it shows that the joy of living endeavors to assert itself.

Two months after a consultation, when I tried to make the situation as

clear as possible to him, he returned and reported marked improvement in his potentia.

I have had occasion to note the disappearance of inveterate ejaculatio praecox troubles after a few psychoanalytic consultations.

Of course, these are instances of emotional transference; nevertheless I mentioned them because, as is well known, ejaculatio praecox is a condition which proves rather refractory to treatment by ordinary suggestion. Psychoanalytic consultations, according to my experience are the best form of so-called persuasion.

There are similar processes which seem practically inexplicable; nevertheless they always disclose an intimate relationship between sexual desire and the craving for activity. The colloquial term used in both instances, "craving" or "yearning," in itself shows an essential similarity. Freud ("Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex") refers to the peculiarity of the sexual instinct which consists in the awakening of the need for mental gratification with the development of the grossly sexual pleasure sense. It seems to me that this holds true also of mental work and of activity in general. There is a common saying, *l'appetit vient en mangeant*,—appetite waits on eating, and that is true also of work. The more we become absorbed in some task, the greater also grows our interest in it, and the greater also our disappointment if something interferes and prevents us from completing it. One's "fingers itch" with the desire to do this or that, is a common expression.

The Swedish word for *Schreibsucht* is "*Schreibjucken*". The "*joken*", fig. and lit. "itching", in this connection denotes something akin to sexual yearning.

In ordinary conversation, too, we use sexual symbols for work, as we do in dreams. An exorbitant charge is called "indecent",—clearly a reminder of the fact that sexuality may represent in the dream the progressive trends of the psyche. It is also a common expression to say that some one is "passionately fond" of his (or her) work. This similarity between sexual instinct and the craving for activity naturally testifies to the wider conception of the libido and its anagogic role. Freud states that ungratified hunger and thirst do not become converted into anxiety, as does the ungratified libido of sex. I am by no means certain that this is correct. The absence of appetite, so common among neurotics, seems to indicate that the reverse is true. It seems, in other words, that the neurotics do repress their hunger precisely as they repress their sexuality and craving for activity. At any rate I cannot dismiss the thought that the suppressed craving for activity, too, may be converted into anxiety. Moreover, I have observed more than once that eating, like alcohol drinking, often stand for work in the analysis. The neurotic frequently follows the rule: "He who does not work shall not eat." I also recall having read in some psychoanalytic work, I cannot precisely trace in which one, that a certain primitive race of people is devoid of any secretiveness about their sexual deeds, but

extremely careful about their eating habits. They look with greatest astonishment and with no little indignation upon the white people's custom of going through the act of eating in the presence of strangers.

Recently I had a strong reminder how colorless the sexual interpretation of a dream may be, whereas the anagogic interpretation puts a new soul into it, so to speak. A 30-year-old unmarried woman dreamed of a young man having a couple of swellings on his nose; she wanted to know whether that double swelling on the nose had broken out because his wife refused to cohabit with him. It turned out that a certain aunt of hers had suggested to her the idea that young men of pure life acquire such skin eruptions. The young man was the analyst, who must lead a pure life, i.e., she had not roused him with her love; she felt an immense resistance against the analysis.

I have already mentioned that the neurotic has the same feeling-attitude towards his sexuality as he displays towards all other fundamental life problems. Against that assumption may be raised the objection that many a neurotic displays a very intensive and highly active sexuality so that apparently there can be no question of any inhibition in that regard. I say "apparently" with reason. We shall see later that this objection has really no value. Not infrequently neurotics display and gratify polygamous tendencies. This fact led Stekel to the theory that the patients repress their religion precisely as others repress their sexuality,—their sins.

Since Stekel, in spite of his opposition to Freud, shares with the latter the inclination to give sexuality wholly a literal interpretation, one is not surprised at the above theory, which is only a consequence of the doctrine morality vs. sexuality. It is even more astonishing that Jung, too, ("The Psychology of Unconscious Processes, 1918, p. 35) adopts a similar standpoint. He states that persons who seem daring, but who do not actually commit any sexual transgressions, possess unconsciously a moral sense, just as formally moral persons harbor an unmoral unconscious. It seems to me that the facts in the case are about as follows: the two, repressed sexuality and repressed religion, appear to be contraries, but they are not. If we look into the ordinary case of a young man, not a neurotic, who indulges in temporary affairs with women, we find that sooner or later these relations cease to gratify him. They begin to disgust him. Does that come from a realization of the social and ethical repulsiveness of sowing one's wild oats? Hardly; such a thought may lead the young man to earnest reflections, but it would not actually cause disgust or tediousness. The new feeling-attitude is induced by the fact that under the respective form of erotic indulgence the young man's capacity for love is not sufficiently engaged, his libido remains unsatisfied so long as it is limited to the sensuous aspects of love life. Consequently, here, too, the sin is one of omission. Contrary to what is commonly thought the surfeit is not due to the young man's failure to gratify his sexuality; irre-

spective of whether his attempts are successful or not, the sense of gratification is actually lacking. When the respective deed is psychically healthy, when the joy of activity, the joy of life generally, is at its proper tempo, the young man soon gets over his depression, just as he leaves behind his period of indulgence in masturbation, and the latter leaves no deep scar or telling impression. Freud ("Vorlesungen," etc., p. 486) states with reference to narcissism and egoism as differentiated concepts: "One may be absolutely egoistic and still maintain strong objectives as external libidinous endowments." That is obviously correct. Erotic love has the evil repute of being mostly selfish love. But if that were true, it would amount to a low form of libido outlet and the neurotic would be justified in identifying sexuality with sinfulness. The morbid feature of egoistic erotism consists of its minus quality. Freud even adds further: "When one is completely in love, altruism and libidinous endowments of objects become fused." When sexual life degenerates into debauch, the subject becomes a neurotic, unless he happens to possess too rudimentary a psychic constitution. This is seldom so clear as when the gratification of sexuality functions merely as a substitute for the craving for activity, as a groping for the deeper sense of life. Persons with strong yearnings, as a rule, take little pleasure in work. The depression is due merely to the failure to express the yearning for activity.

It is characteristic that the subject engrossed chiefly in erotic pursuits often

manifests the same inhibited feeling-attitude towards the latter as towards all other life problems. The occasional erotic adventure plays the same role in his mind as masturbation does in the case of the ordinary sexual neurasthenic. Adventures become burdensome to him, and the expected gratification always ends in a *Katzenjammer*, in the "morning after" feeling. His dread of activity is transferred over to the sexual sphere. He preserves the primordial attitude with its implication that sexuality is the quintessence of the forbidden, and, of course, he fails to realize that activity or work is what he truly denies himself. He plunges into his neurotic depression, etc.—I repeat it,—not because he ventures into the realm of Eros, but because he does not adventure with a will into the realm of work. He who burns his candle at both ends may shorten his existence, but doing so does not necessarily make a neurotic of him.

It is a well-known fact that when the erotic assumes too great a role in one's life it involves the need of changing the love objective. (For the present I do not care to go into the psychology of the Don Juan type or the Messalina type. There are a number of contributions of value on this subject in the psychoanalytic literature. *Vid.* in particular, W. Stekel, "Störungen des Trieb—und Affektlebens," vol. II., authorized English version by James S. Van Tessaar.) I only want to mention that Freud usually assumes that the polygamous vacillation is traceable to the Oedipus complex, so that the objective unconsciously sought is the mother, resp. the

father. That is the reason why the Don Juan type is never satisfied, why he never finds what he seeks. Undoubtedly the mother (or the father) of such subjects appears as the libido objective in the dreams. But viewed in the anagogic sense, what the polygamic subject seeks and never finds is work—his life work.

As to the other type, showing a repression of sexuality,—the type of subject harboring moral scruples against sex,—in my opinion, it follows from what we have stated above, that religion in its symbolic sense, or morality, in its deeper sense, if you prefer this term, is as completely repressed here as in the first type.

For that reason it is not possible to trace a sharp line of distinction between the two types, as already intimated.

One of the chief objections raised by Freud and his school against the Zürich school is that, with the latter, the analysis, being directed to the actual data, must remain superficial and it fails to bring to light the infantile reminiscences. The Freudian analysis claims to be the only one entitled to call itself "*Tiefenanalyse*." But for me this term is by no means identical with "tiefsinnigsten"—most thoroughgoing—analysis. Freud states that the dream is a (cryptic) fulfillment of a (repressed, inhibited) wish. Consequently he regards the dreams as something egoistic. The anagogic counterpart to this is that our deeper life, our progressive trend, too, finds fulfillment in the dream. Freud often refers to cases in which the dream, lacking thorough analysis, apparently represents anything but an unfulfilled wish.

He speaks of what he calls counter-wish dreams, among others,—the kind of dreams a patient sometimes has during the period of his most active resistance. These dreams seem to contradict the wish fulfillment theory, but their motive power is said to be the wish to expose Freud's wish fulfillment theory itself as false. A young woman, after a great inner struggle, resolves to submit to treatment by Freud, against the wish of her relatives and contrary to the advice of other medical authorities, and she dreams ("*Traumdeutung*," p. 113): "She is asked at home to come to me no longer. She then refers to a promise on my part to treat her without any charge, if necessary, and I say to her: I can make no concessions in money matters." In his brief analysis of this dream, Freud states that naturally he had made no such statement; it is an utterance that belongs to the patient's own brother. What the dream tends to prove, says Freud, is that the brother was right. The brother has an immense influence upon her and to please him is the ambition of her life as well as, incidentally, the genesis of her illness, adds Freud. It is obviously very difficult to pass any judgment whatever upon another's dream interpretation, aside from the fact that in the present instance the other one is actually the greatest master in the field. But it seems to me that the brother represents the resistance to the neurosis,—he stands for the neurosis itself. And I am fairly positive that the words "She is asked at home" means "my brother forbids me." The peculiarity is that precisely what Freud points

out as the exact opposite of the wish fulfillment, namely the statement "in matters of money I can make no concessions," is, according to my view, a proof of wish fulfillment in the anagogic sense. Freud's interpretation depends on taking "money" as well as "sexuality" in other than a symbolic sense, i.e., literally. Money is a symbol for interest. Her "brother" thus forbids her to continue the analysis. She hopes to be able to stand alone and not devote all her interest to him (i.e., hopes to be analysed without having to pay). But Freud, the analyst, her conscience, her forward-striving self, permits no compromise, no trifling. According to my opinion the deeper sense of the dream is to be sought in this sense. Naturally the other interpretation is also correct, but that is much more superficial. We know, thanks to Freud himself, how varied and manifold the determinants of a single dream may be. Observe how egoistic that dream became according to Freud's interpretation of it. It frequently happens that a sexual or literal explanation makes a dream appear extremely egoistic, whereas the anagogic interpretation shows its trend to be exactly opposite. And yet both interpretations may be correct, each of course in its own sphere, for both trends are present in the dreamer. The question is merely which of the two interpretations is the deeper one. The bipolar character of dreams with reference to their meaning Freud himself has taught us to recognize. Therefore I am amazed that the great master does not perceive the anagogic meaning of the dream. Accord-

ing to my opinion, the anagogic meaning, in this particular instance, is not only the deeper one, but represents the genuine "*Tiefenanalyse*"; for the demand to disregard every contrary consideration and to avoid no sacrifice, moral or material, as expressed in the statement "no concession in money matters," flows out of the unconscious.

The wish to prove the analyst wrong, so often disclosed in patients during their phase of resistance, a wish which the above dream apparently fulfills, comes naturally, not from the unconscious in the Freudian sense, but from what he calls the fore-conscious. But when such an inferior wish is fulfilled, it is characteristic of the dream that something much deeper is portrayed at the same time, something that points in the exact reverse direction.

Stromme, whose conception of this subject, I believe, is more extreme than that of any other analyst, also holds that every dream is progressive in its trend,—a conception which at any rate appears to me infinitely more correct than the opposite view according to which the dream is filled only with inferior wish fulfillments. To my mind the problem looms up as follows: Does the dream portray an inferior libido object? I believe that I am justified in saying that this is rarely the case, at any rate when the respective persons which figure as the libido object appear more or less revealed in the dream. That there are also incestuous objectives portrayed in the dream is another matter,—for everything depends on how the latter are considered during the analysis. Stromme

is of the opinion that the persons dreamed about do not necessarily represent always the same symbols. In the analyses of the Freudian school the mother always represents the mother, the incestuous objective. But it is desirable to ascertain each time precisely what role she plays in the dream phantasy. It is very instructive to note in how many different aspects one person sees another, according to the changing mood. It amounts to that. I find myself willing to accept Stromme's view that the same person may represent different things in accordance with the varying circumstances,—the more so because I have arrived at the same conclusion independently of him.

Regarding the inferior libido object, I want to relate a dream which hardly permits another conclusion than that there is such a libido. The attendant circumstances were very unfavorable, too, during the day following the dream. A young neurotic had an unmasked incestuous dream accompanied by a pollution. The dream was as follows:

"I thought I was loving my sister and that I was fornicating with her."

This patient had a strong family fixation and about two years before he had fairly conscious incest phantasies about this sister. These incest thoughts had never played a great role in his mind, and perhaps for that reason they disappeared before long. This is the patient who was in the habit of praying to God to help him avoid masturbation. It is very interesting to note what a relatively insignificant role the incestuous thoughts played in contrast with his

masturbation habit. It is undoubtedly true that the unconscious craving after an incestuous objective produces neurotic symptoms, but this is so because the unconscious incest wish bears a symbolic meaning.

Naturally the patient found the dream unpleasant. But that is not enough to account for the subsequent persistent depression and for his inability to work which persisted throughout the day following the dream. Theoretically he should have been unusually elated on the following day, despite the content of that dream. That sister appeared often in his analysis and he had always regarded her as a progressive type of woman. But when I asked him to describe her again for me; he told me that formerly she had been a very jolly person, keenly interested in men, but that she had grown much more sedate in that respect, and she was no longer so keenly erotic. The subjective counterpart to this description: during the day before the dream he happened to reflect how much more quiet his feelings were with respect to girls, how much more erotic he had been formerly; also he contrasted his current lack of ambition with his former interest in his work. That sister, in other words, represented his neurosis. In the dream he seeks identification with the weaker side of himself. Hence the depression during the following day.

The representation of an inferior libido object in the dream here appears obvious.

A young compulsion neurotic tells me the following dream:

"I was at the theatre and I saw a drama about a man who had a wife as well as a sweetheart."

Later he recalls an additional portion of the dream: "he was on a road which at first seemed poorly constructed, later he found a good road,—a certain street in the City."

It turned out that a girl with whom he had been formerly in love lived on that street. He describes the girl as follows:

She left school early, later she studied on her own account, but her self-instruction did not amount to a great deal.

During the previous day this brother's girl had enticed him away from his lessons and the two went to a moving picture theatre. This brother of the girl he describes pithily: "He is doing nothing. The sweetheart is consequently a representation of indolence, while the wife represents work (the analysis). The subject's emotional state was decidedly bad after this dream; he had perhaps the worst time he had experienced during the analysis. He even had headaches, a trouble of which he had very seldom occasion to complain. The headaches disappeared during the analysis.

The difference between the previous and the present dream rests in the progressive objective portrayed by the latter,—although there is a certain similarity between them.

A neurotic, 26 years of age, dreams:

"My landlady came into my room. I arose, walked towards her and seized her by the breasts."

The landlady he describes as follows:

"A repulsive old woman, lazy; every day she lies in bed till eleven o'clock."

Indolence was the very sin the patient harbored in his breast. He found it hard to get out of bed, although he always managed to rise in time to go to his office. That morning, however, he imitated literally his indolent landlady and stayed in bed till noon, feeling stupid and filled with anguish and self-reproach. Here, if anywhere, it seems to me that the anagogic meaning is the one capable of interpreting the dream and the dreamer's state of mind during the following day. It was not the infantile, gerontophilic craving which caused the depression.

On two other occasions during the analysis this patient had gerontophilic dreams. But those dreams had no particular effect on him. Why? The old woman represented a progressive type to his mind and stood for the analysis.

What is true of the incestuous objects in the dream is also true of the gerontophilic. I fail to understand why it would have been any advantage to have said that the old woman was a substitute for the mother. Of course, she was that, viewed sexually.

A couple of years before the treatment he had three unmasked incestuous dreams. Twice the dream was about his mother, the third time it was about his sister. He harbors no trace of gerontophilia consciously, any more than he does incestuous feelings for his mother or for his sister. He even remarked: I found these dreams so strange! During the waking state I never have such feelings. That precisely

is the case: during his waking state he feels no interest in his work. It is well known that young boys are often charmed by elderly women. Between 12-13 years of age he indulged in many sexual phantasies, and some of them centered around a woman twenty years older than he (approximately his mother's age). That woman has figured more than once as the objective in his dreams,—once even during the treatment. Naturally these tendencies, which expressed themselves in his gerontophilic dreams, were infantile, originally normal tendencies further supported by primordial Oedipus-like reminiscences. Obviously, this man was incestuously fixed. And his is an illustration of the typical attitude: his objectives soon pall on him and so does his work. That the woman who appears in the dream is not his mother, but represents work, that the dream is not merely the fulfillment of an infantile projection or craving, is shown most plainly by the effect of the dream while the subject was still burdened with his neurosis. When he will learn to seek his work on awakening, instead of yearning after new female objectives, his incestuous fixation will vanish.

We also find often that the mother, formerly standing for the progressive trend in the dream, changes her functional role and next represents the neurosis, without being the libido objective. The incestuous trend, I am inclined to believe, stands mostly within the consciousness which I always consider as the seat of the inferior trends.

The neurotic to whom I have referred last had the same experience as many

other neurotics. When he felt well, his thoughts did not turn a great deal to his mother, but when he regressed emotionally he always longed for her. She was the most comforting objective at the time; and he did not appreciate, of course, that what he was unconsciously yearning after was work-activity. The psychoanalytic principle that the neurotic wants to preserve his infantile feeling-attitude towards the mother is undoubtedly true, but this wish is conscious, or at least relatively accessible to consciousness.

The same patient dreamed on another occasion that he was in a room in a lower apartment where the windows had no curtains, and that he performed the sexual act there with a certain girl.

The circumstances were as follows: he had been transferred to another department of the corporation for which he was working and there he found himself under a man who had formerly occupied the same rank as he in the business. The patient became quarrelsome, aggressive and at the office his attitude was one of animosity against his new chief. This he had at first avoided to mention,—he felt ashamed and did not care to confess the fact. But the truth presently came to surface. I reproached him for his lack of candor and honesty. The dream makes good these shortcomings on his part by representing the subject as carrying out the sexual act in a lower floor room having no curtains, in plain view so that any passer-by could see what was going on. The chief theme of the previous day's analysis had been the admonition that he must im-

prove his attitude towards his office chief and make their relations as pleasant as possible.

The girl in the dream he describes as follows: moody, flies easily into anger, and then she is repulsive, scornful; when her disposition is pleasant she is fairly interesting, friendly, quite happy; she has just found a new position and seems to like her work.

His description of the girl happens to fit also his chief. He had a verbal controversy with the latter, but after yesterday's analytic sitting he returned to the office in a repentant mood, determined to try by all means to get along with his chief.

The dream may be explained in this

connection through its anagogic meaning. The real objective, of course, is the chief, and the dream portrays pictorially his resolution to get along with his chief as well as possible. (The girl has found a new position; she seems to like the work).

The subject felt fairly well after the dream. Therefore I myself was astonished to find that the account of the dream objective pointed at first to the neurosis. The solution was suggested by the detail mentioned above that "the girl liked the new work." Of course, she stood partly for an inferior objective; but she also represented, so to speak, the neurotic getting better.

(To be Continued.)

[Translated by Dr. J. S. Van Teslaar.]

The Psychology of Everyday Mistakes

(Continued from 3:54)

By Samuel A. Tannenbaum, M.D, New York

We are now in position to raise and discuss some of the following questions: In what sense does Freud use the word 'painful'? What sort of 'experiences' or memories does an individual repress? How painful (unpleasant, displeasurable) must an idea (memory, desire) be to be a candidate for repression?

We might also inquire, seeing that repression is supposed to be a "biological defence-mechanism", what Freud imagines would happen to the individual if he did not possess the faculty of repressing his painful ideas, but had to realize them and have it out with them. Freud does not consider or answer any of these questions in his discussion of the psychology of errors.

If we turn to Jones for an answer to the question what constitutes "pain" in the psychoanalytic (*i.e.*, the orthodox Freudian) sense, we find the following statement (*l.c.*, pp. 624-625.): "According to Freud . . . the mind [is] an apparatus or machine which can be stirred into activity by *any stimulus*, emanating either from without or from within the individual,

. . . . the object of the resulting activity [being] always to restore the original condition of rest by bringing about a state of affairs in which the effect of the disturbing stimulus is nullified. The result of setting the primary system in action is to create a condition of diffuse restlessness and excitation, which radiates widely throughout the mind, and which seeks in every direction for an outflow of the accompanying energy. The tendency to replace this state of excitation, which is experienced as pain or displeasure (*Unlust*), by the relief of satisfaction, which is experienced as pleasure (*Lust*), constitutes what we term a wish."

According to this, then, "pain or displeasure (*Unlust*)" is that state of excitation in the primary system of mental activity (*i.e.*, the mental activity of the first few weeks or even months of life from which the Conscious and the Unconscious subsequently develop) which results from the operation of *any* internal or external stimulus. If so, all stimulation of the primary system is painful and all thoughts and incoming stimuli ought to be repressed.

Stimulation of the primary system of mental activity cannot be the definition for "pain or displeasure"—unless the primary system of the adult, now known as the Unconscious, consists only of matters (impulses, desires, cravings) unacceptable or discomforting to Consciousness. And that is exactly what the psycho-analyst maintains. Jones puts it thus (*l.c.*, p. 629.): "Among the unconscious and indestructible wish-impulses ["which constantly affect our daily life, our character, judgments, and conduct"] are a considerable number the fulfilment of which would be in flagrant contradiction to the aims of the later developed secondary [conscious] system, and these on ethical, social, aesthetic and similar grounds. The fulfilment of such wishes would no longer produce a pleasurable affect, but a disagreeable one."

From one of our former quotations from Jones (cf. p. 39) we know that the "truly unconscious" consists of matters, chiefly of a sexual nature, that it is indiscreet to print. That is what he meant when he said that repression concerns chiefly "internal, extremely intimate and personal mental processes". Speaking of these unconscious tendencies (*l.c.*, p. 115.), Freud says that they "are of an objectionable nature throughout, that they are shocking from an ethical, aesthetic and social point of view; they are things one does not dare even to think, or thinks of only with abhorrence." They are, "above all, the expression of a boundless, reckless egoism." Of these censur-

ed wishes Freud specifies the following: perverse and incestuous sexual strivings ("desires which we believe to be far from human nature"); hate, revenge, and murderous wishes respecting one's nearest kindred.

According to Freud, then, the content of the Unconscious is thoroughly objectionable, shocking, disgusting, repulsive, abhorrent, and vile to the point of being unthinkable. These matters are kept out of consciousness by the censure so as to save the ego from the pain which would accompany the realization of its egoistic, barbarous and infantile nature. To what all this reduces itself is apparent in Hitschmann's statement (*Freud's Theories of the Neuroses*, New York, 1913, p. 54.) that "the fundamental characteristic of the unconscious is its sexual character, 'sexual' taken in its broadest sense."

Let us now examine some of the lapses (errors) which Freud and Jones, severally, cite and analyse in proof of the correctness of "the fundamental conception" of psycho-analysis, to see whether the motives that they discover behind those lapses correspond with their account of the content of the Unconscious. Jones, we find, forgets to make calls on uninteresting patients; he forgets to visit patients in the nursing-home, because he finds it irksome and time-consuming to go there; he forgot to call on another Doctor's patient when he himself had a more important engagement; he signed a letter with his Christian name (Ernest) because he

was piqued by the omission of this name in a citation in a German journal which referred to him as "Jones, M.D."; in speaking of a great fire he said "Halifax" instead of "Bangor," because he didn't want to think of a fire near his own home (as a child he had feared fires); he erred in naming one of Shakespeare's plays because of "an English complex" (*i.e.*, pride in his knowledge of English literature) and a desire for scientific priority (he was jealous of Rank's claim to have discovered a slip of the tongue in *The Merchant of Venice*); he wrote "My dear Freud" instead of "My dear Fred" because of a conceited wish to be on terms of familiarity with the Viennese psychologist; in addressing a letter he wrote "19" (Professor Freud's house number), instead of the correct number (55) because he would have preferred that particular letter to go to Vienna; in addressing a letter to a patient living in a distant city, he wrote "Toronto" (where Jones was then residing) because of a wish that the patient were living nearer him; he read "sixth century" instead of "sixth volume", owing to a desire for an early reference to a certain subject; when he suffers from oversmoking he misplaces his pipe; unintentionally he opens a new tin of tobacco though he had resolved to use an old tin (he prefers fresh tobacco); to save himself from more work than he already has he misplaces his journals; he takes the wrong key out of his pocket when he prefers to be home; and because of the same

desire on other occasions he tried to open another's door with his own key, instead of ringing the bell. And these are the thoroughly objectionable things, the unthinkable and abhorrent things, the ethically, esthetically and socially shocking tendencies which Jones's conscious ego-ideal could not accept and had to relegate to the limbo of the Unconscious! Frankly speaking, we should expect the Unconscious to be made of sterner stuff than this. For, surely, mankind is not so delicately constituted that it cannot bear without disgust or abhorrence the thought of desiring fresh tobacco, of preferring to be the first discoverer of a slip of the tongue in Shakespeare, or of wanting to be at home instead of in the laboratory. No; the content of Jones's Unconscious does not fit Freud's description. Such desires as those he says he has repressed are among the most trivial of the conscious possessions of the race. Nor are these "sexual" in any sense. It follows, then, that either Freud's description is wrong or that the matters cited by Jones to prove the Unconscious do not prove it.

But, perhaps, Jones was deterred by motives of discretion from publishing such analyses of slips of his own as might present him in an unfavorable light to the public. Inasmuch as considerations of this kind would not apply to the analyses of the slips of unknown persons, we shall state briefly the motives (tendencies) he discovered in the lapses of others. Just after a discussion of sexual topics, and

while sitting in front of a very hot fire, a man was asked to choose a number at random and he chose 986, an exaggeration, 98.6° F.,—because he associated heat with life and love, and because, Jones says, he had “a strong masturbation complex.” (This “analysis,” it must be added, is extremely far-fetched and tenuous); Darwin was apt to forget facts that did not harmonize with his theories; a man forgets to invite an indifferent acquaintance to a social function; a lady almost completely forgot to call at her dressmaker’s to try on her bridal gown the day before the wedding (“she has since been divorced”); a busy man forgets to post letters entrusted to him by his wife (thus betraying a veiled antagonism towards her or an abnormally high self-esteem); a hospital interne left the hospital without leave and forgot to turn out the light in his room (thus giving his chief the impression that he had not gone out); a number of times one of Jones’ patients forgot to shave the right side of his face (as a symbol that he was disinclined to lay bare his sexual life!); Cardinal Newman forgot that he called the Infallibilists “an insolent and aggressive faction”; a hospital interne forgot the surname of a nurse with whom he was quite intimate and whose Christian name was the same as that of two girls he had loved before her (recalling her surname would have reminded him that her name was not that of the other girls and this would have reminded him of his faithlessness!); a man betrayed his contempt for ex-

perimental psychologists by speaking of Professor Titchener as Kitchener (kitchen-er); persons mistake Tuesday for Wednesday when they are anxious to have the week pass quickly; a woman gave Jones less change than was due him ‘because she wished his purchase had been larger rather than smaller’; a lady, speaking of Shaw, said she thought highly of all her (for “his”) writings; a (jealous?) physician spoke of the work of “Breuer and I” (instead of “Breuer and Freud”); a neurotic mailed a letter intended for Jones, telling him he was coming to him for treatment, to another physician whom he had consulted (thus letting him know what he thought of him); small merchants often give their customers less change than is due them; a man took the wrong train and thus got out of a distasteful duty-call, etc., etc. Such, then, are the painful motives, the unthinkable ideas that humanity cannot accept and that it represses into the Unconscious whence they can exert their baleful influence only when the censure is off guard! It is needless to say that it is the universal experience of mankind that these and other motives of the same kind are not repressed, are constantly—and to our knowledge—influencing our lives; that, in fact, we never think of our fellows as being free from such motives.

It is precisely because we credit humanity with these unhandsome impulses that we have religions and laws and ethical codes to restrain them. As Freud would say, and does

say in another connection, "Even the layman knows that." We repeat, then, that if the Freudian Unconscious, resulting from repression, were a fact it would have to be made of sterner stuff to correspond to his description of its contents and to warrant his assumption of the repression of ideas because of their painful, disgusting and abhorrent nature.

But perhaps Freud's analyses, written primarily for a Teutonic audience, are more candid, more complete, less influenced by considerations of discretion, and therefore more calculated to show us the Unconscious in its true image? To answer this, let us rapidly review some of the lapses that Freud analyses. Lichtenberg was so saturated with the Homeric poems that he read "Agamemnon" for "angenommen"; a young man at a banquet rose to roast (instead of "toast") his superior; a Social-Democratic paper spoke of "the Clown Prince" (for "the Crown Prince"); a bashful young man offers to "inscort" a lady home; a woman quotes her family physician as advising her to give her husband whatever food she (for "he") wants; a disgruntled chairman declared the meeting "closed" (instead of "opened"); a lady who disliked her friend's husband could not recall his name; a young man, displeased with his brother-in-law, lost a pencil the latter had given him; Shaw makes Caesar forget to take leave of Cleopatra, thus symbolizing the Emperor's feeling of superiority; a man goes to a meeting of an association for which he no longer cares—the day after the

meeting; the day after her honeymoon a lady suddenly caught sight of a man in the street whom she recognized as "Mr. K." instead of as her husband, which he really was (This marriage came to "a most unhappy end."); some people are very apt to forget to mail letters entrusted to them, thus manifesting their disregard for the writer of the letters or an exaggerated self-esteem; we are all too apt to forget to return borrowed books, pay small debts; many of us more often mislay bills than incoming checks; Freud seized a tuning fork instead of the plexor when he was in a hurry; he walked up to the third story, instead of stopping on the second, when he was lost in a reverie of "going too far"; he broke a piece of bric-a-brac with a well directed kick when he wanted an excuse for getting rid of it; a man forgot the word "aliquis" ("a-liquis, a liquid") in a quotation from Virgil when he might have been worried about the failure of the recurrence of the catamenia in a friend; servants break crockery and bric-a-brac when they are sulky or not in sympathy with the mistress; a man who would have liked a little vacation turned a valve in the wrong direction, thus causing enough damage to make work for the day impossible; and so forth.

At least nine-tenths of this sort of material, "analysed" without regard to important details connected with the events, is of such a trivial nature and so little calculated to prove Freud's thesis of a repression-Unconscious that one wonders why these

matters are even mentioned as proof. As they stand they prove nothing.

The sexual factor, the basis upon which the Unconscious is allegedly founded, appears so rarely in the analyses that it is perfectly justifiable to regard it as purely accidental or coincidental when it does occur, though, of course, there is no reason why something sexual may not result in a lapse now and then as well as any other cause. And is not Professor Freud crediting humanity with a tender-mindedness which is not warranted by the facts? Is mankind really so full of the milk of human kindness that it is shocked to the point of abhorrence on discovering that it is selfish, vain, egoistic, self-willed, afraid of pain, resentful of contradiction, pleasure-loving, etc? We think not. Darwin did not repress a fact unfavorable to his theory because he could not bear to think of the possibility that he had erred. (We may remind the reader that Darwin also forgot facts favorable to the theories he espoused). Creditors do not believe that debtors find the thought of being in debt so abhorrent that they repress the knowledge of their indebtedness. Surely Lichtenberg was not so ashamed of his interest in Homer that he had to repress it. And so on. If Professor Freud's definition of the Unconscious is right, the material with which he seeks to establish it is wrong; if his material is right, his definition is wrong.

But we would not be understood as implying that there is no such phenomenon as repression. Repression,

as has been long known, especially to philosophers and poets, is a fact. But not in Freud's sense. According to him forbidden, tabooed, wicked tendencies of which a particular individual has never been conscious are in a state of repression, *i.e.*, are really actively alive in the mind and constantly striving for gratification but kept from consciousness by a function which he calls the *censure* (often erroneously translated as "the censor"). He also applies the term to the active and forceful, even though sometimes involuntary, expulsion of painful memories and forbidden (irreligious, unethical, criminal, lewd, disgusting) desires from consciousness into the Unconscious where they continue to live and where they are constantly struggling to return to consciousness and be gratified. Obviously, if there is no Unconscious in Freud's sense neither is there a repression in his sense. Tendencies of which an individual has never been conscious and which suddenly come into consciousness only as the result of particular experiences cannot be said to have existed in the Unconscious any more than the explosion or the ensuing wound may be said to have existed before the hammer struck the bullet, or the tone be said to have existed before the finger struck the key on the piano. What is merely latent or potentially present cannot logically be said to exist in the Unconscious. Matters which once were in consciousness and have left memory traces, and of which we are no longer conscious, have been, in ways unknown to us,

more or less temporarily disassociated from the conscious stream. Not merely because their recollection would be painful, unbearable, humiliating, disgusting, abhorrent, but even because it would be useless or inconvenient to have them intrude on our attention when we would be thinking of other things. This kind of repression is not, properly speaking, a "biological defence mechanism" in the Freudian sense; the Lethe which causes us to forget "painful" matters also causes us to forget pleasurable ones. That we very often try to forget painful experiences and that we ultimately succeed in doing this to some extent is unquestionably true; but this repression—which is no more than forgetting—does not go so far nor so deep as Professor Freud would have us believe. These repressed matters are always sufficiently near the surface of consciousness to be capable of being recalled if a sufficient number of associated ideas can be evoked. (The contents of Professor Freud's Unconscious cannot be called to consciousness by any amount of effort; they can be known only by their effects—lapses, symptoms of neuroses, dreams, psychoses.)

What, then, remains of Professor Freud's Unconscious? As the product of repression, as consisting only of "sexual" and vindictive material (hate, revenge, murder), as ever striving for gratification, and as having its own laws and modes of expression—nothing.

Unconscious mental processes there are, but they differ from conscious processes only in that the ego is not

always aware of them. The difficulty with which they are recalled is no criterion as to their pathogenicity, their unnaturalness, their immorality, or their unthinkableness. That they contribute to the symptoms of a psychoneurosis or a psychosis, that they are often revived in dreams and speedily forgotten, and that their voluntary recollection is often extremely difficult, sometimes impossible, is unquestionable. And it is equally certain that sometimes the most trifling or casual association brings back—without any evidence of resistance—vivid and detailed memories of which, to conscious thinking, not a trace had been left for many years.

XI.

After these preliminary remarks let us proceed to the analysis of some instances of forgetting. It must be borne in mind, however, that the psycho-analysts say that not all forgetting is due to the repression of something unpleasant and that they seek for an "unpleasantness-motive" only in such forgettings which surprise the person, *i. e.*, where the forgetting is "conspicuous and unjustified" (Freud). But in actual practice they invariably neglect all other factors and concentrate all their ingenuity on the discovery of an "unpleasantness-motive"; and if they cannot find something painful or unpleasant directly related to the forgotten memory or intention they continue the search till they find something only indirectly or remotely related to it and then label that as the cause of the forgetting.

In the opening paragraph of his fourth lecture (*l.c.*, p. 41) Professor Freud says:

"In the group of lapses based on forgetfulness (*forgetting names or projects*, mislaying objects, etc.) I cannot believe in such a [*i.e.*, a physiological] basis."

But by the time he reaches page 55 he seems to have forgotten this, for he says:

"Forgetting names does seem to be especially facilitated psychophysiologically and therefore also occurs in cases in which *the interference of an unpleasantness-motive cannot be established.*"

Example 38.—During a session with a professional writer of fiction I wished, by way of comment on his plan to read his stories to a secretary, to refer to a story told of one of the greatest of Shakespeare's American editors, to wit: that he used to read to his wash-woman his commentary on the plays so as to get an idea how clear or effective his remarks were. I know this man's name, as the saying is, as well as my own; but, for all that, I could not recall it at the moment. Chagrined at my lapse of memory, I quickly began to associate freely and these names came to me: Corneille, Racine, Voltaire, Moliere, Richard Grant White. All this happened so quickly that my patient knew nothing of it and I was able to carry on the conversation with only a slight break in the continuity of what I was saying. Richard Grant White was the name I had forgotten. Not because of any painful associations with

the name or with that variously esteemed scholar. To me he had always proved a stimulating and suggestive editor. I used to read his numerous essays on Shakespearean topics with a great deal of interest. His son's (Stanford's) unfortunate death at the hands of a "degenerate" did not concern me. As soon as I found I could not recall the name I remembered having read of a French dramatist who had been guilty of the absurd practice of reading his plays to his cook. But who was he? What French dramatists do I know? Corneille,—no, it was not he; Racine,—no; Voltaire,—no; Moliere,—Yes. Have I any resistances to Moliere? No. As a matter of fact, I know very little about Corneille, about as much about Racine; a good deal about Voltaire, especially his absurd criticism of "Hamlet". Now I note that all these French names are disyllabic, three of the four have almost the same vowels and in the same sequence, and that "Voltaire" is an almost perfect rhyme to "Moliere". The rhyme association brought back the name "Moliere". But "White" is nothing like the French names, either in sound or in rhythm, and we are therefore still in ignorance why this name was forgotten and then recalled.

The explanation is, however, not difficult. I was in doubt about the advisability of interrupting my patient in his narrative, and even more doubtful about the appropriateness of what I had in mind to say. Even while I was speaking I was still mentally debating these

questions. The forgetting was due to this distraction of attention, to interference, and not to repression. By the time I had recalled the name "Moliere" I had recovered my equanimity and had definitely decided to tell my patient the story about White. And then the forgotten name came back to me.

Example 39.—In Shakespeare's "Coriolanus" (Act I, Scene 9) is an instance of the forgetting of a name under peculiar circumstances which has not been explained by the commentators. The valiant and haughty patrician, Caius Marcius, who hated the people as he did hell-pains (if we may be permitted the anachronism), having been given the title "Coriolanus" for his valiant and bloody services in capturing Corioli, and having been offered a large share of the rich booty taken by the Romans, ostentatiously rejects the proffered gifts. Then, as he is going to have his wounds dressed, he suddenly bethinks himself of a Volscian—a man who had once befriended him—who had been taken prisoner. A generous feeling overcomes him and he decides to secure this man's freedom. The following dialogue between Coriolanus and his General ensues:

Cor. The gods begin to mock me.
I, that now
Refus'd most princely gifts,
am bound to beg
Of my lord general.
Gen. Take it; it is yours.
What is't?
Cor. I sometime lay [lodged] here
in Corioles

At a poor man's house; he
us'd [treated] me kindly.
He cry'd [called] to me; I
saw him prisoner,
But then Aufidius was with-
in my view
And wrath o'erwhelm'd my
pity. I request [beg] you
To give my poor host free-
dom.

Gen. Oh, well begg'd!
Were he the butcher of my
son, he should
Be free as is the wind. De-
liver [free] him, Titus!
(*To Titus Laritus.*)
Titus Marcius, his name? (*To*
Coriolanus.)
Cor. By Jupiter, forgot!—
I'm weary; year, my mem-
ory is tired.

It will be of interest to determine the cause of Coriolanus's forgetting the name of his benefactor,—a name which he undoubtedly expected to be able to recall. (Note the vexation implied in the words, "By Jupiter, forgot!") This is the more interesting if we remember that in Plutarch, Shakespeare's "source" for the incident, the hero does not forget the name of the Volscian. Why did Shakespeare depart from his original? Surely not because he wanted to tell his audience that the memory can get tired and that it then forgets the names of one's benefactors. Nor that the exertion of battle or loss of blood from scalp wounds (Coriolanus's face was covered with blood) can cause such lapses of memory. It is barely possible that Shakespeare meant to do

no more than illustrate the maxim he put into the mouth of Falconbridge, new-knighted, in "King John" (Act I, Scene I), that "new-made honor doth forget men's names." But that is extremely unlikely in so serious a drama as "Coriolanus", in which the poet's interest is so largely psychological. That the poet did have a serious purpose in mind is highly probable from the fact that he not only departed from Plutarch as to the forgetting but that he also altered the description of Coriolanus's one-time host. In Plutarch he is "an old friend, an honest, [*i.e.*, honorable] wealthy man"; in Shakespeare he is "a poor man" who had used Marcius kindly. The alteration is significant. In Coriolanus's forgetting of a poor man's name we have a subtle reminder of his hatred and scorn of the people, just at the moment when the audience and the reader are in danger of forgetting the hero's great tragic failing.

Did Shakespeare knowingly and intentionally introduce this slip? We have no doubt he did. Other makers of fiction, *e.g.*, Meredith, Lytton, Galsworthy, have also introduced lapses of various kinds into their works, because their observation of human nature has taught them to understand the significance of slips of the tongue, etc. "Even the layman knows", from the understanding of his own lapses, that slips of the tongue, etc., are slips of the mind. And the fact that this is so generally known proves that there is nothing unconscious about it.

Example 40.—Another interesting instance of a forgetting in Shakespeare occurs in "Hamlet", Act 2, Scene 2. We may recall that Hamlet, the dilatory avenger, greets the leading man of the company of strolling players with the request to recite a speech which he calls "Aeneas' tale to Dido", especially that part of it which deals with Priam's slaughter. But his interest in that speech is so great that he does not wait for the actor but begins to recite the speech himself. He begins:

"The rugged Pyrrhus—(*hesitatingly*) like the Hyrcanian beast—" But this does not satisfy him; it does not have the right ring. "'Tis not so," he says;—"it begins with Pyrrhus." Suddenly the missing words come to him:

"The rugged Pyrrhus,—he whose sable arms", etc. Hamlet, we see, has momentarily forgotten the correct text ("he whose sable arms") and has substituted for it a phrase ("like the Hyrcanian beast") which was not a part of the original speech. To explain this forgetting and faulty recollection, we must understand Hamlet's attitude toward his task and why that particular speech, dealing with the fates of King Priam, Prince Pyrrhus, and Queen Hecuba, came to his mind. Hamlet, we know, cannot bring himself to kill his uncle, king and stepfather. He has evidently identified himself with "young Pyrrhus", for he, too, found his "antique sword rebellious to his arm, repugnant to command",—he, too, as a painted tyrant, "like a neutral to his will and matter",

could do nothing until "aroused vengeance set him new a-work." To do a deliberate murder he would have to be as "rugged" (savage) and "hellish" as Pyrrhus. But he, the Wittenberg philosopher, can be neither. The thought of murder is utterly abhorrent to him. If we recollect that to an Elizabethan Englishman the Hyrcanian tiger was proverbial for all that is barbarous and savage, we can understand the significance of Hamlet's paramnesia. His judgment of Pyrrhus—so clearly implied—and his loathing for the deed, could hardly have been better indicated by the poet.

Again it ought to be asked whether Shakespeare did this knowingly or whether something within him that he did not understand guided his pen? To our thinking, Shakespeare was so great an artist and had so fine an understanding of human nature that we unhesitatingly credit him with knowing what he was doing. No first rate poet or dramatist will permit anything to get into his text that does not mean something to him, that does not answer a purpose. Great artists do not blindly perpetuate their inspirations.

Example 41.—Up to about two years ago I never was able to recall the surname (Mast) of one of my relatives by marriage. Then it occurred to me to do some auto-analysis and get rid of the difficulty. Doing this, I got the following results:—the name as such is of no significance, notwithstanding its obvious appropriateness for a certain kind of symbolism. The bearer of the name is the husband of

one of my favorite cousins. Him I did not like because he had on several occasions offended my professional pride, either by consulting other physicians or otherwise manifesting a lack of confidence in my professional skill. Two or three such incidents passed in review before my mind's eye. Then his name came back to me and since then I very rarely have any difficulty in recalling it at will. But during the past two years his attitude toward me has completely changed, we are much more intimate than we formerly were, and our relations are quite amicable. So that it would be unjustifiable to conclude, in the manner of the Freudians, that I now recall the name because my analysis has enabled me to overcome the resistance to it. As a matter of fact, I still occasionally, on meeting him, have to review the above facts to myself before his name comes to me,—a phenomenon which contains the key to the forgetting as well as to the remembering. Owing to my dislike for him, I had made no effort to fix his name in my mind, had established no association paths between my mental images (visual and auditory) of him and the word "Mast". The analysis had the effect of building up such association paths. My ability to recall the name easily now is due not to having overcome my resistances to it but to having impressed the name on my mind with the resolve to remember it and having established a large number of associations to the memory traces representing it. That this is the correct explanation is proved, for me, by the

fact that this is the way in which we forget and remember names even of those whom we like and who stir up no resistances in us.

Example 42.—While trying to recall the name of my neighbor "Bergoffen" I found myself unable to do so. Instead of it the name "Berkenfeld" came to my mind and would not down. By all the rules of the psycho-analytic game, the reverse should have happened. For, try as I may, I can find not a single unpleasant thought in connection with Bergoffen; he is a patient of mine, pays his bills promptly, is very friendly, a sociable neighbor, not obtrusive, always polite, a "good sport", etc. My relations with his family leave nothing to be desired. His name can be split up into two German words: "Berg" (meaning "mountain") and "Ofen" (meaning "stove") or "offen" ("open"), stereotyped phallic symbols, the first male, the others female. But this had never occurred to me before and the utmost introspection fails to bring to light anything of a sexual nature that might be, even remotely, relevant to my forgetting of the name. "Berkenfeld" or "Birkenfeld" is associated in my mind with many "painful" ideas (in the psycho-analytic sense). It is the name of a man whom I have twice treated for several months for an extremely interesting and complicated compulsion neurosis which would not yield an inch to my psycho-analytic efforts. When I think of the time spent on him and the unpaid bill and the man's sufferings, I am far from happy. His name literally means

"a field of birch trees", but that brings me not a whit nearer to an explanation for its coming to my mind when I was trying to recall Bergoffen's name. It is of interest to note that I had not heard from Berkenfeld for months prior to the above lapse, had not thought of him and had no desire to see him again. Bergoffen, on the contrary, I see occasionally; but, for all that, I know Berkenfeld and his name better than Bergoffen. The two names bear the same number of syllables, their vowels are almost the same, syllable for syllable, and their first syllables (as pronounced in English) are practically the same. The forgetting and the false recollection were, in all likelihood, determined by the law of associations and by the principle of the more familiar for the less familiar.

Example 43.—As additional disproof of Professor Freud's statement (*l.c.*, p. 55) that the forgetting of proper names "can be traced to a counter-intention which aims either directly or indirectly at the name in question", "to an aversion on the part of the memory to remember anything connected with unpleasant experiences and which would revive the unpleasantness by a reproduction," we shall cite the following experience of Miss G., a young lawyer. While sitting in her office one day and suffering from a slight headache, she found herself indulging in amorous fantasies about one of her male clients whose name consists of four consonants and two vowels, somewhat like this: "Brodaf". But, notwithstanding the

fact that in her mind's eye she saw him clearly and was living over an experience with him, she could not think of his name (which, it must be stated, is as unusual and as meaningless a word as our fictitious rendering of it). Instead of it the word "Bralof", the name of another male client, came to her. This latter name is as meaningless and as unusual as the other one, consists of as many letters, of the same vowels (in reversed order) and, with but one exception, the identical consonants.

"Brodaf" was a divorced man whom Miss G. had known only a short time but with whom she was having "an affair." He was not very good-looking (she likes good-looking men), but she was attracted to him for his charming personality and intellectual attainments. (Besides, he was free and had no objections to a liaison with her). "Bralof", on the contrary, was "good to look at", had no intellectual attainments, and was encumbered with a wife and religious scruples. Miss G. had lured him into an affair with her after she had known him for several months, but, after several painful scenes between them, he had ceased to call on her. She had not seen him for at least five months prior to the incident we are now discussing. These are the essential facts.

Miss G. frankly admits that she prefers "Bralof" to "Brodaf" and we might therefore say that here we see an illustration of the tendency of the Unconscious to indulge the individual in what he prefers. But this does not

square with the "pleasure-pain principle" of Freud. The principle of greater pleasure, if there is such a principle, is not the same as the "pleasure-pain principle". According to the latter, Miss G. should have had no difficulty in recalling "Brodaf" and should not have substituted "Bralof" for it. There were many more unpleasant ideas associated with "Bralof" than with "Brodaf" and therefore that is the name she should not have been able to recall—if there were any truth in Professor Freud's formula. The name "Brodaf" had not been repressed and was not in the process of being repressed, inasmuch as Miss G. really had no objections to the bearer of the name. Besides, it is difficult to see how she could have unconsciously repressed Brodaf's name, seeing that she was consciously indulging in a fantasy in which he was so clearly visualized. To the name as such she had no associations whatsoever. In this case, then, Freud's principle of "psychic flight from unpleasantness" fails altogether.

If we had to offer an alternative explanation for the above forgetting we should say that it was due to at least three factors: 1. the headache; 2. the much longer acquaintance with "Bralof" and 3. the preference for him.

It might of course be contended, and, no doubt, Professor Freud would so contend, that Miss G's. thinking of Brodaf as Bralof means that she "unconsciously" wished Brodaf might be as good-looking as Bralof. The answer to this is that Miss G. is and

has been quite conscious of this wish.

The above case is, we admit, complicated and not completely satisfactory from any point of view. But nothing in life is so simple and uncomplicated as our friends the psycho-analysts would have it. Life is, indeed, a tangled web. It would be extremely easy in reporting analyses of lapses to omit complicating details and thus to simplify the analyses, and no doubt that has often been done; but it is just the complicating details that are responsible for the lapses we are studying. In the vast majority of instances "the unconscious" factor will, when analysed, prove to be only a name for these unknown and disentangled (not the repressed or unknowable) factors.

When we turn our attention to the *forgetting to carry out plans or intentions* we find that Freud and Jones are not in agreement. We may recollect that Professor Freud had said (*l.c.*, p. 41) that in the group of errors based on forgetfulness (forgetting names or projects) he did not believe in a purely physiological basis. It is true that as to the forgetting of names he subsequently (p. 55) contradicts himself. But as to the forgetting to carry out intentions he sticks to his guns. He says (*l.c.*, p. 52):

"Forgetting plans is uniform in meaning; its interpretation is not denied even by the layman. The tendency interfering with the plan is always [!] an antithetical intention, an unwillingness concerning which we need only discover why it does not come to expression in a different and less disguised manner.

But the existence of this unwillingness is not to be doubted."

But there is evidently something wrong with this statement, for Dr. Jones (*l.c.*, p. 58) says only that

"forgetting is often [!] determined by a painful mental process of which the subject is unaware either at the time only or permanently."

In the habit to forget to post letters "unconscious motives can sometimes [!] be detected", says the same authority (*l.c.*, p. 46), although on page 44 (*l.c.*) he has told us that "a counterwill frequently [!] leads to forgetting," especially as to the making or keeping of appointments. With these inconsistencies and contradictions we might leave the subject, but, inasmuch as in actual practice all psychoanalysts proceed on the theory that all forgettings are due to an unconscious desire to escape from doing something "painful" or not acceptable to the ego, we shall examine a few such lapses and show that there is no truth in the theory.

Example 44.—A few days ago I stepped out of an elevator on to the fourth floor of an apartment house and started to walk towards an apartment to my right, although the patient I was calling on (Mrs. G.) lives in an apartment to the left. This is a clear instance of a momentary forgetting. I had absolutely no resistance to making a call on this particular patient; I have no painful associations to her whatsoever. Why, then did I turn to the right? Because as I was approaching the building in which this patient resides I passed the house

adjoining it in which up to a few weeks ago lived Mrs. C, another patient of mine. (Mrs. C's apartment had been on the sixth floor and to the right of the elevator. The two buildings are mates and built on one plan.) That turned my thoughts to Mrs. C. and I began to think of one of her problems and that if she had not moved I would step in to see her for a few minutes. At this moment I stepped out of the elevator and turned to my right, exactly as if I had forgotten that this was not the building in which she had lived, that she had moved, that she had been on the sixth floor, and that I was making a professional call on Mrs. G. The psychologist can truly say that I would have liked to call on Mrs. C., and even truly say that I would have preferred to call on her rather than on Mrs. G. (Mrs. G. was a purely medical case and therefore not as interesting to me as Mrs. C., whom I had been analysing for some months.) But in all this there was absolutely nothing that I was not conscious of and I was not under the influence of any "antithetical intention" "or unwillingness" as to calling on Mrs. G. My lesser interest in a medical case than in a psychoanalytic case cannot even by the greatest reach of the imagination be spoken of as "a painful mental process."

The error in turning to the right instead of to the left is another instance of the phenomenon I have termed "somatization", and is analogous to Professor Freud's ascending an extra flight of stairs when he was

thinking of climbing. Both of us did something unwittingly, unintentionally, but not "unconsciously".

The above misgoing is of interest from yet another angle. If Dr. Jones's Unconscious (or was it his Pre-conscious?) watched over his health and made him lose his pipe when he had been smoking too much, why should not my Unconscious have had a greater regard for my bank balance than to have sent me on a social call instead of a professional call, especially as the favored person was no longer residing in the apartment towards which my feet were carrying me? It may of course be said that the Unconscious is not so quick to learn of the changes in the outer world, of the alterations in what is called "realities". But if that is true, how is it that Professor Freud's Unconscious so quickly learned that his inkwell was not sufficiently artistic for the rest of the table decorations and should be broken at the first opportunity? Or perhaps the Unconscious of different persons learns with different degrees of rapidity? But if so, what becomes of Professor Freud's doctrine that the Unconscious does not learn, that it takes no cognizance of changes in time and place, that in it the past is ever present? To say the least, such an Unconscious is a very contradictory Unconscious—and a very accommodating one for a psychotherapist devoted to the healing of suggestible neurotics.

Another possible answer to the question with which we began the preceding paragraph is that "the psychic life

is the arena of the struggle and exercises of antagonistic tendencies" (Freud) and that my going to the right was the issue of such a conflict. Granting that my desire to see Mrs. C. was sufficiently great to overcome my sense of duty to my patient, to myself and to my family, wherein was the latter painful to the degree of turning my footsteps away from a paying patient? The performance of my duties is not only necessary to me but decidedly pleasurable. And, on the other hand, neglecting or forgetting to make a professional call is positively painful. To have patients, to cure them, to earn emoluments, are sources of satisfaction to all physicians. The mere fact that I would have enjoyed seeing Mrs. C. does not make my calling on Mrs. G. painful. Even the positive absence of any pleasurable emotion in connection with the call on Mrs. G. would not justify us in thinking of it as something painful. Pain is not the absence of pleasure, any more than pleasure is the absence of pain. And even if we grant that many or even most of our actions are preceded by a conflict of differing desires or motives, what reason have we for assuming that the more pleasurable motive is the one that wins out? Absolutely none. And what reason has anyone for saying that the motive which wins out is the more pleasurable one, especially if one assumes a conflict of desires of which the individual is not conscious, and where there is no way of estimating the degree of intensity of those desires? Absolutely none. Only if we knew

all the motives that enter into the determination of an action, and if we could be sure which of these are pleasurable and which are painful, and if we could measure the degree of painfulness or pleasurable of the conflicting affects, then only could we say that the ensuing action was the expression of this or that principle. Till then the prediction of a "pleasure-pain principle" (Freud) is only an assumption without any warrant in facts.

Example 45.—Miss Y. has from time to time during the past summer been giving Mr. L. an occasional check to support him while he is writing "his book" and trying to establish himself as a writer of short stories. On the first of the month she went to bed thinking she must send L. a check next morning. But next morning she forgot to do this. Later in the day she had occasion to make out a check for someone and then it occurred to her that she had forgotten L's check and proceeded to make one out.

Without any hesitation Professor Freud would say that Miss Y's forgetting was due to an unconscious counter-will, an unwillingness to part with her money, or a dislike for Mr. L. And, as we have said several times before, he would be quite right as to the reluctance about giving Mr. L. money to support him in what many would call "idleness", but Prof. Freud would err in the introduction of the "unconscious" element. Mr. L. has undoubted literary talents but has met with little success as yet. His determination to establish himself as an

author had determined him to refuse other modes of employment. He was threatened with eviction, his clothes were threadbare, and he was living on almost nothing a day. Then Miss Y came to his rescue at my suggestion, but she did not approve of his conduct. "A strong, able-bodied man", she said, "ought to support himself in any way he can and write when he can afford to do so." But notwithstanding this, it gave her pleasure to do what she felt I would like her to do. And, after all, he was as much entitled to his philosophy of life as she to hers; and if he was willing to accept money, she was willing to let him have it. (What she gave him was a very small fraction of her charities and gifts). Besides, he might score a genuine success and then she would rejoice in having assisted him in his need. (We all love to play the rôle of patron of arts). To say the least, then, her motives were quite mixed. In the absence of any means for measuring the degree and kinds of emotions associated with her various motives, —her conscious motives, be it noted— and in the absence of any means of determining all the motives actuating her, it would be most unscientific to assert that her forgetting was due to a preponderance of the painful over the pleasurable elements. Especially as a much less mystical explanation is at hand—an explanation which applies to the forgetting of pleasurable as well as painful intentions for, it must be borne in mind, pleasurable plans and purposes are forgotten by

all of us just as often, probably, as painful ones.

What is this explanation?

Simply this: When we resolve to do something at a certain time, *e. g.*, to make out a check tomorrow morning, we set up or establish association bonds between the concepts "check" and a certain time "to-morrow", and when the morrow comes we ask ourselves "What have I to do to-day?" and we recall the tasks and chores we have assigned ourselves for to-day. We may in this way even run over in our minds many things we have done on previous days, or what we ought to do to-day, and then dismiss those we do not care to do. It may and does, of course, happen that now and then we fail to recollect some particular task. Such a forgotten task is quite as apt to be a pleasurable one as an unpleasant one.

The manner in which this forgetting is accomplished is by no means definitely understood, for, unfortunately, we still know altogether too little about the biologically much more important problem of how we remember. If we knew more about the psychophysics of remembering we should, ipso facto, be nearer the solution of the mystery of forgetting. Meanwhile, considering the present state of our knowledge, we must content ourselves with the explanation offered us by the law of the association of ideas. To assume the existence of a wish to remember brings us no whit nearer a solution of the problem of memory inasmuch as we know nothing about the

wish, neither its nature, its why nor its how.

A wish that lies awake to remind us at the proper time of the intention to perform a purposed task is a much greater mystery than the remembrance of the task itself. It is perfectly legitimate to ask how the wish brings the purpose to consciousness; and if we ask this we are back again to our original question of how we remember. But the matter becomes still more complicated and more mystical if we also have to assume a positive wish to forget. For we can't help asking how these contradictory wishes operate and what determines the outcome when they operate simultaneously. And as if this were not already sufficiently complicated, Professor Freud introduces us to another and a still more indeterminate entity, viz.: an unconscious wish not to remember. But this is not all. To account for some of the symptoms of a psycho-neurosis Freud has to assume an unconscious conflict between an unconscious wish to remember and an unconscious wish not to remember a desire of which the individual was never conscious!

How does a person make sure that he will remember to do something, *e. g.*, to make out a check on the morrow, at a certain future time determined upon by himself? The answer to this question is this: The individual associates the intended future action with certain sensations and ideas which he expects to occur at or about the time of the intended action. With the arrival of the time determined

upon, the anticipated sensation or idea occurs and with it the associated idea, *i. e.*, the intended action, comes to mind. Thus, for example, I resolve to send a check to-morrow morning; in doing so I momentarily visualize myself as sitting at my desk at a certain time, say 9 o'clock, and making out a check for X. When 9 o'clock to-morrow morning comes I suddenly remember that I must make out a check for X. How is this brought about? The clock strikes nine as I sit in the dining room; immediately the thought comes, if I have heard the clock, "It's nine o'clock; I ought to make out that check for X", and I go to my desk, take thence the check book, make out the check, etc. If I have not heard the clock strike 9 and the thought "It is 9 o'clock" has not occurred to me, I will not think of the check for X until some time later in the day when the thought may occur to me. "I wish to do something or other to-day that I think I have forgotten; I wonder what it was?" and then I go over in my mind all the things I had resolved to do to-day and trust in this way to find some idea which by association will bring the check for X to my remembrance. I may also be reminded of the check for X by hearing his name mentioned, sitting at my desk, handling the check book, etc. Thus, then, the machinery of remembering is, as the psychologists say, the machinery of association, and this, as we know, is only another example of the law of habit.

It may, of course, happen that I fail to remember to send that check to X

until several days have elapsed, or until I am reminded of it by some accidental association, etc. Under what circumstances does such forgetting take place? Briefly we may say that the determination to recall fails if the association bond between the purpose and the sensation or idea upon which it was made contingent is weak, if the association links are few, if the contingent association is of such an unobtrusive nature as not to attract our attention when the predetermined time arrives, if the resolution was made at a time when the mind was not intensively occupied with some other matter (so that our resolution either did not "register" at all or only very faintly, *i. e.*, made no binding associations), etc. In these cases the predetermined sensation or idea fails to arouse the associated idea and we say we have forgotten. Desire, conscious or unconscious, has nothing to do with it. Often enough we desire to do a thing even though we dislike doing it. And it is universal experience that we recall the necessity or the determination to do all sorts of things, no matter how unpleasant they may be, and that, on the other hand, we often enough forget to do things from which we get or expect to get a great deal of pleasure. A reluctance or unwillingness to part with our money may, of course, decide us not to heed the predetermined signal to make out that check, or to postpone it (just as the desire to go on sleeping makes us ignore the alarm clock); and it may well happen that such a postponed or neglected action is not again recalled (ow-

ing to the absence of associative bonds) until it is too late,—but that is a very different matter from forgetting because of a counterwill.

How we recall a forgotten memory is well described in the following quotation from Professor James' "Psychology": "We make search in our memory for a forgotten idea, just as we rummage our house for a lost object. In both cases we visit what seems to us the probable neighborhood of that which we miss. We turn over the things under which, or within which, or alongside of which, it may possibly be; and if it lies near them, it soon comes to view. But these matters, in the case of a neutral object sought, are nothing but its associates." One has only to read this simple explanation, and think of one's own experiences, to be convinced of its truth. If forgotten matters were always of an unpleasant nature, then we would be compelled to accept the Freudian theory of counterwill, resistances and purposive forgetting; but inasmuch as neutral or indifferent and even pleasant matters are forgotten, at least as easily, and even more easily, than unpleasant ones, the theory of purposive forgetting must be discarded among the many other "wastes of Time."

Psycho-analysts have a great deal to say about the hidden purpose in breaking appointments. Let us therefore examine the subject a little. Tuesday morning I arranged to go to the theatre on Saturday night to witness a performance of "Irene." I do not like musical comedies, begrudge the time spent to sit through one and

would prefer to spend the time otherwise. But, for all that, I am resolved to go to "Irene" because one of my friends and patients is playing in it and I promised to go to see and hear her. Besides, "Irene" is said to be one of the good recent comedies of its kind. I therefore register in my mind the fact that Saturday night I am going, etc., that I must make no other appointment for Saturday night. As soon as the word "Saturday" is mentioned I recollect my appointment, by virtue of the process of association, and this keeps me from making other appointments for that evening. But suppose that Friday or Saturday forenoon someone in whom I am very much interested asks me for an appointment for "to-morrow night" or "to-night" (not mentioning the word "Saturday"), what will happen? In all likelihood I shall forget my Saturday appointment and make another engagement. Why? Not because of any counterwill to the musical comedy, although that is still present to some extent, but because of the failure to associate my intended trip to the theatre with the words "to-morrow night" or "to-night." A very great interest in some other matter might also, undoubtedly cause me temporarily to forget the theatre appointment; but this would be the case even if there were absolutely no counterwill to the Saturday night engagement. The greater interest can crowd out or overwhelm the lesser, but a forgetting thus produced cannot possibly be regarded as the product of a "biological defence mechanism."

Is there anyone who has not sometimes experienced the phenomenon of suddenly forgetting what he was just about to do or to say, what he had just said or what question had just been addressed to him? We think not. With its occurrence one gets a feeling of bewilderment, blankness, and something amounting almost to consternation. The psychologists have passed this phenomenon over, like many others, in silence. In our experience such a sudden oblivion occurs as the result of a sudden emotional shock, surprise, embarrassment, a sudden diversion of the interest upon an unrelated subject, intense mental preoccupation with some other matter, etc. It is most apt to occur in persons, *e. g.*, hysterics, in whom disassociations occur easily. Fatigue, headache, hunger, narcotism, worry, etc., are particularly conducive to its occurrence.

Example 46.—Miss K., aet. 48, unmarried, neurotic (depression and dissociation), called up Mrs. F. (a psychoanalyst who had treated Miss K. before she came to me) on the telephone last Friday to tell her of a very desirable room that was for rent in the apartment in which she was living. The conversation lasted a few minutes during which several matters were spoken of, but the subject of the room was not even referred to. Later in the evening Miss K. suddenly felt an impulse to tell Mrs. B., her landlady, that she had telephoned to Mrs. F., but she checked herself because she could see no reason why she should tell her something that did not concern her. (And yet it was out of sympathy

for Mrs. B. that Miss X wanted Mrs. F. to secure a tenant for Mrs. B.'s vacant room). Next day it suddenly occurred to her that in her telephone conversation with Mrs. F. she had forgotten to mention the room and had thus broken her promise to Mrs. B. The following day, Sunday, the vacant room, which adjoins her own, did not occur to Miss K. until she was having her dinner (at 9 P. M.); but she put the thought of telephoning to Mrs. F. aside, saying to herself: "I am too weak to telephone now; I'll do it after my dinner." Half an hour later she again thought of Mrs. F. and the vacant room but decided not to telephone then because Mrs. F. "hates to be disturbed at such a late hour."

To explain the above forgetting and the other incidents we must inform the reader of the following facts: Miss K. is somewhat asocial, earns her living by writing short stories and by typewriting; she is very sensitive to sounds, especially to the chatter of the ordinary roomer. Fearing that the vacant room might be rented by someone not to her liking she decided to communicate with Mrs. F., whose nephew was looking for a "nice room" and who was congenial to Miss K. But Mrs. F.'s mother is very sick and Mrs. F. is sensitive to the behavior of neurotics. Miss K. therefore approached the telephone with varied feelings and ideas: she must not betray any neuroticism in her voice (Mrs. F. had only recently asked her, very pointedly, how long she would go on being analyzed), she must be sure

to inquire about Mrs. F.'s mother's health; and she must not give the impression that she is telephoning mainly about the room. Miss K. admits she dislikes her landlady and hopes that the vacant room will not be rented.

With the above facts in our possession, Miss K.'s forgetting becomes a very simple problem. But for the information contained in the last sentence in the preceding paragraph, psychoanalysts would have been sure to discover all sorts of unprovable and unconscious motives in the lapse of memory. Miss K.'s unwillingness to see that room rented is manifested in various ways, notwithstanding her conscious intention to telephone to Mrs. F. A conscious counterwill made her forget. How? Out of considerations of politeness Miss K. had decided not to speak of the room at once but to introduce the subject casually toward the end of the conversation; but her suppression of the theme went too far; she overdid the suppression and the idea dissociated itself too entirely from the other matters destined for Mrs. F.'s ears. In connection with this we must caution the reader not to confound "suppression" (the conscious and voluntary dismissal of an idea from consciousness) with the Freudian "repression" (the unconscious and involuntary expulsion of a painful idea from the Conscious into the Unconscious). Incidentally, too, we might inquire of the psychoanalyst why, if the Unconscious is so "truthful", Miss K.'s suppression did not betray itself in a slip of the tongue?

[To be continued]

REVIEWS

FREUD, PROF. SIGM.—*Massenpsychologie u. Ich-Analyse*. [Crowd psychology and ego-analysis.] Internat. Psychl. Verlag, Vienna, 1921; 800, pp. 140.

The author bases his work on Le Bon's excellent book, "The Psychology of Crowds." The latter gives, among others, the following characteristic factors. Persons who, taken individually, are ever so different from one another, acquire, by virtue of their transformation into a crowd, a kind of collective soul by virtue of which they feel, think and act differently than they otherwise do. Modern psychology has established the fact that unconscious phenomena play a preponderating role not only in the organic-vegetative life but also in the intellectual functions. Our conscious acts are derived from an unconscious sub-stratum which has its basis especially in hereditary influences. This contains our ancestry remnants, the social soul. In the crowd the intellectual acquirements of the individual are blotted out and his individuality disappears. The racial unconscious takes its place. The characteristics which seem

to have their origin in the crowd may be thus explained: in the first place, owing to the fact that he is in a crowd, the individual gets the feeling of irresistible power which permits him to entertain impulses which, single handed, he would have to curb. The anonymity diminishes the sense of responsibility. In the second place, every feeling and every action in a crowd has a contagious quality of such intensity that occasionally the individual sacrifices his personal interest in favor of the crowd's will. The third and most important cause (of which the aforementioned is only a sequel) is its suggestibleness. Le Bon gives the following as the main characteristics of an individual who is one of a crowd: a loss of conscious personality, predominance of the unconscious personality, orientation of thoughts and feelings in a certain direction by suggestion and contagion, and a tendency to immediate realization of the suggested ideas. "The individual has become an automaton without a will." In addition thereto, owing to the mere fact that the individual belongs to an organized mass, he goes down several steps in the scale of

civilization. He becomes a creature of impulse, acquires the spontaneity, violence, wildness, but also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive races. The crowd is easily influenced, uncritical; the improbable does not exist for it. It thinks in pictures which are evoked associatively, just as happens in the individual when he is indulging in fantasies, and which are not judged in accordance with their agreement with reality.

As we see, Le Bon has studied the subject in the light of a "psychology of the depths"; he has powerfully paved the way for Freud's latest study. Freud very largely adheres to Le Bon. Above all he seeks to determine how far the libido concept serves to explain the observed phenomena. He conjectures libidinous bonds in them because only such can overcome the general hostility to and hatred of one's neighbor,—forces which oppose a fusion into an intimate group. He finds a conclusive factor in the relationship of the crowd to its leader, a relationship which, he says, Le Bon did not consider adequately. He illustrates this by referring to the army and the church. He supports this view with the idea of a (perhaps fictitious) love of the leader for the members of the crowd. A second argument he finds in the cohesion among the individual members of the crowd. In connection with this second factor he speaks of the phenomenon of identification. He speaks of three kinds of identification. The first is the primitive early affective bond to another person. Even before the Oedipus complex has been developed,

the little boy is especially interested in his father, would like to be like him. The second variety consists in identifying oneself with what one wishes to possess rather than with what one wishes to be. This is illustrated by the child that loses his kitten and then plays as if he were the little kitten. The third variety consists in identifying oneself with a person (who otherwise means nothing to us) because he manifests an emotion to which we think ourselves justified. An example of this is furnished by the well-known psychic infection in the presence of an hysterical attack. The bond which binds the individuals of a crowd together Freud finds in this third group; and the affective mutuality he finds in the attitude to the leader which may, to be sure, be represented merely by an idea or a chance representative of the leader idea.

The subject of the leader leads Freud to speak of the "ego-ideal." Psychoanalysis has taught us to regard as a kind of narcissism the turning of the libido upon the ego as a love object (after the period of absolute primitive autoerotism). Once the juvenile narcissism is past it begins to bring about something in the individual which may be designated a sort of watchful control organ; conscience is a part of this. In this way the primary narcissism, becoming refined, furnishes a kind of model-ego, an ego-ideal; an ideal-ego that one can admire and in which one can lose oneself. It may happen that the ego-ideal is transposed upon another person; this happens, for example, in the case of the idealization which characterizes being in love.

The object is treated, under circumstances, as if it were one's own ego and becomes the object of an unlimited overestimation which is comparable only with self-love. In some forms of love-object selection it is quite obvious the love-object serves to replace an unattainable ideal in oneself. It is loved for the perfections which one would like to find in oneself and which one wishes to acquire in this indirect way as a means of gratifying one's narcissism. With this overestimation there goes an uncritical attitude, a blind sub-servience and a blind sacrificing of one's own ego. In the discovery of such an ego-ideal in the outer world it need not always be a matter of sexual love; it may proceed without the sexual element and may be a transient phenomenon. Thus we approach the phenomenon of crowd psychology again. Persons who join a crowd have in some manner found a common ego-ideal in their leader. A crowd is "a number of individuals who have set one and the same object in the place of their ego-ideal and consequently identified themselves in their ego with one another."

The whole crowd is hypnotised by its leader. Freud closely links up hypnosis with being in love. In both we have the same uncritical self-surrender: to Freud both are a libidinous surrender. He refers to Ferenczi's assertion that the hypnotist takes the place of the parents when he issues the command to sleep, a command which often introduces the hypnosis. He thinks there are two kinds of hypnosis: one, kindly and amiable, which he attributes to the mother prototype, and the other threatening, which

he ascribes to the father. The command to sleep signifies a command to withdraw one's interest from the rest of the world.

This is the point where we discover a two-fold regression in the crowd-phenomenon: (1.) in the intoxication (diminished consciousness) which characterizes the crowd (as a result of aforementioned facts); every such condition is characterized by regressional traits; (2.) in the linking to a common "father," the leader, wherein, according to Freud, is resurrected an old pattern from the early evolution of humanity, viz.: from the prehistoric herd. In his "Totem and Taboo" Freud developed the idea casually enunciated by Darwin that the original form of human society was a herd which was dominated solely by a strong man. And now, says Freud, where we find the characteristic traits of the crowd we shall find again the familiar picture of the very strong individual in the minds of a crowd of fellows minded like himself, just as we find in the aforementioned representation of the original herd. "The psychology of the crowd, as we know it from certain descriptions (Le Bon, etc.),—the loss of conscious individuality . . . etc. . . . —all corresponds to a state of regression to a primitive mental activity such as we ascribe to the primitive herd The will of the individual was too weak; no other impulses than collective ones came into being Just as the primitive man is virtually contained in every individual, so the primary herd may be re-created in any human assembly; as far as crowd forma-

tion habitually dominates mankind we recognize in it the continuance of the herd. We must conclude that the psychology of the crowd is the oldest human psychology."

The leader of the crowd therefore corresponds to the prototype of the despotic primitive father of the herd. He was, according to Freud, a free man among the unfree; his ego was not bound with much libido; he loved no one but himself, and he loved others only as far as they served his needs—a masterly nature, wholly narcissistically inclined.

Let us for a moment return to hypnosis. "The hypnotist", says Freud, "awakens in the subject a quantity of his archaic inheritance which was not hostile to the parents and which experienced an individualistic resurrection with respect to the father, namely, the idea of an over-powerful and dangerous personality as to whom one could assume only an attitude of masochistic passivity and give up one's own will Only thus can we conceive the relationship of an individual of the primitive herd towards the primitive father." Freud attempts to establish a new point of view with reference to suggestion. He says: "Hypnosis has a good claim to the designation 'a crowd consisting of two'; suggestion, we may say, is a conviction based, not on perception and thinking, but on an erotic bond." A definition which, like much else in this book, may be open to some objections. Objections which, to be sure, do not suggest themselves only at this point, but which strike at Freud's premises.

One must distinguish between differ-

ent crowds. "Every individual is a member of many groups and has built up his ego-ideal on the most varied patterns. Every individual has a share in many group-souls, e.g., that of his race, his social station, his religion, his politics, etc., and can acquire a modicum of independence and originality through and beyond these. These permanent and established mass formations, owing to the uniformity of their effects, do not attract the attention as much as the spontaneous, sudden and quickly developed crowds which gave rise to Le Bon's brilliant characterization of the crowd-soul; and in this tumultuous and ephemeral crowd, superimposed upon the others, we find the miracle that what we have learned to know as the individual is lost, leaving not a trace behind, even though only temporarily. I conceive of this miracle thus: the individual has given up his ego-ideal and exchanged it for the crowd-ideal incorporated in the leader."

I have hitherto restricted myself to giving the reader of this review as faithful an account of the contents of Professor Freud's fascinating theme. I could have pursued a more critical course. But this would have had to do with the premises at the bottom of his treatise. One could take exception, for example, to the all too great certainty with which the theory of the primitive herd is accepted. One might attempt a defence of the primary herd instinct which Freud repudiates. One might object to his theory of suggestion and could criticise more sharply his "libidinous" bonds. Here we shall speak of only two of his

extravagances, because they are of a less general nature:

In discussing the parallels between the hypnotist and the primitive-herd-father, Freud asks: "How does the hypnotist bring his mysterious power about? By asking the subject to look him in the face; he hypnotizes him, in a most typical manner, by the power of his glance. But it is the sight of the chief that is dangerous and unbearable for primitive man It is true that hypnotism may be effected in other ways, an erroneous procedure [??] which has resulted in inadequate physiological theories, e.g., through fixation on a shining object or listening to a monotonous sound." Of course if all other modes of hypnotism are to be rejected as "erroneous" then the parallel must hold. Need I remind the reader that no information has come down to us about the glance of the herd-father?

Recently Freud has enunciated a primary "oral" phase of the libido-organization in which the individual incorporated, by eating, the desired and treasured object and in so doing destroyed it. In a passage relating to this, he says: "The cannibal, as we know, has not progressed from this phase; he loves 'to devour' his enemies, and he eats only those whom he loves." [Comment unnecessary.]

H. Silberer. (T.)

BUNDY, W. E., Ph.D.—*The Psychic Health of Jesus*.—New York (The Macmillan Co.), 1922; 8 vo, cloth, pp. 18-299; \$3.00.

Dr. Bundy, Professor of the English Bible in De Pauw University, un-

dertakes in this finely printed and lucidly written volume to rehabilitate the psychic character of Jesus and to show that this founder of a potentially great religion was mentally neither normal, subnormal, nor abnormal, but supernormal. This, we may frankly say, was to be expected of him from the position he holds in his university. Jesus has been charged by different writers with having been an ecstatic, an epileptic, a neurasthenic and even a paranoiac. Dr. Bundy analyses the evidence of these writers (Holtzmann, Rasmussen, Lomer, Hirsch, Binet-Sangle and others) and satisfies himself—and he will, no doubt, satisfy many who wish to think like him—that Jesus was none of these things, and not even a fanatic. We doubt whether there is enough tangible evidence to prove or disprove any of these theories. The religious prejudices of the reader will enable him to find in the book what he likes to think of the personality of Jesus.

The book is an extremely scholarly piece of work and contains a valuable bibliography which, however, is by no means complete. Berguer's recent splendid study is not even mentioned. We regret to note the absence of an index.

S. A. T.

WILLIAMS, DR. E. H.—*Opiate Addiction: its Handling and Treatment*. New York: The Macmillan Co. (66 5th Ave., N. Y.), 1922; Cr. 8 vo, cloth, pp. 25-194; \$1.75.

This excellently printed and well-written book is a valuable addition to

the study of an important socio-medical problem and deserves to take its place by Dr. Ernest Bishop's important book ("The Narcotic Problem"—published by the same firm) on this subject. One who undertakes the actual treatment of drug addicts will find here full, detailed, and accurate directions and suggestive practical hints for the proper handling of these patients. The methods of treatment by gradual reduction and by sudden withdrawal are dealt with at great length and the relative merits of each are discussed fully. Those who wish to try the methods known as the Lambert-Towns method, the Pettey method, the Sceleth method, or the Bishop method, will find full and specific directions here. Dr. Williams knows the medical and legal phases of his subject thoroughly and knows how to present them interestingly to his readers.

But to our regret we find nothing, or almost nothing, on the psychology of the narcotic addict. This is the more remarkable when we find that the author knows that unless the patient wants to be cured he cannot be cured by any method. Narcotic addiction is a psychoneurosis, just as chronic alcoholism is, and its successful prophylaxis and treatment depend altogether on character building, on sympathetic understanding, encouragement, re-education, and on helping the victim in his conflict with the obscure motives that dominate him in his conflict with his environment and his "fate". Constitutionally addicts are just as healthy as the average human being is. We regret to find Dr. Williams laying the blame for the predis-

position to addiction on heredity. To cure an addict he must be made to realize that he is curable, that he is not constitutionally (hereditarily) doomed, that he has brought the malady on himself (except where he is the victim of bad medical management while suffering from some organic malady), and that a cure can come if we can develop in him the will to be well.

S. A. T.

BIRNBAUM, DR. K.—*Kriminal Psychopathologie*. Berlin (J. Springer), 1921.

The painstaking author of 'Psychopathological Documents', Dr. Karl Birnbaum, now offers us what he considers a systematic presentation of the psychopathology of the criminal. The enormous amount of material at the author's disposal is presented very lucidly and constitutes a splendid introduction to the study of this important sociologic phenomenon. To our regret some aspects of the subject, e. g., the sexual derelictions, have been very inadequately treated. The work, furthermore, clamors for a second volume which should present the reader with illustrative cases. It is also to be regretted that Freud's theories are nowhere in this book taken into consideration. The author's purpose to give us a survey of the whole field of the phenomenon dealt with seems to have been perfectly accomplished.

STEKEL. (T.)

FLATAU, DR. G.—Kursus der Psychotherapie u. des Hypnotismus. [A course in psychotherapy and hypnotism.] Berlin (S. Karger), 1921.

A brief but well oriented book on all forms of psychotherapeutics, even psychoanalysis (which is very coolly rejected). The author says he saw a number of cases in which analysis failed and in which hypnosis accomplished a cure. Then he tried to analyse three cases but failed although he got more out of the patients than he would have got by the ordinary method of taking a history. In connection with this it must be pointed out that the failure to cure by analysis is a reflection not against analysis but against the analyst and, secondly, that after analysis many patients go to other physicians so as to cheat the analyst of the credit of having cured them. What would Flatau say if I were to enumerate all the patients who came to me for treatment after hypnotism had failed to cure them?

Stekel. (T.)

KLOSE, DR. E.—Die Seele des Kindes. Eine Einfuehrung in die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes fuer Eltern u. Erzieher. [The Soul of the Child. An introduction to the mental evolution of the child for parents and teachers.] Stuttgart (Fr. Enke), 1920.

The soul of the child in six stimulating and fact-crammed lectures! The subject matter is one of the utmost importance. It would be very desirable

that the next edition of this book should contain a lecture on the child's sexual life. It is in this sphere that the Freudian school has achieved its most valuable results and shed most light. The child's soul can be understood only if due consideration is given to the researches of Freud and his disciples. Inasmuch as we have learned that so many perversions emanate from early infantile experiences and impressions, we must seek in the future to avoid all those mistakes whose sequelae are the neuroses. The prevention of the psychoneuroses must be begun in early childhood. Here physicians, teachers and parents must cooperate. The regeneration of man is a question of proper education.

Stekel. (T.)

JONES, DR. E.—Die Therapie der Neurosen. [The treatment of the neuroses.] Vienna (Internal. psych. Verlay), 1921.

Freud is a monarch who has a representative in every province, whose duty it is to defend his monarchy by God's grace and to safeguard his teachings from impurities. Ferenczi reigns in Hungary; Abraham in Berlin; Jones in England and America. The last takes his duties very seriously and lets it be known far and wide that no psychotherapist has the right to call himself a psychoanalyst unless he accepts all of Freud's teachings, bag and baggage. What would we say if the discoverer of antiseptics did not permit a physician to call himself a believer in antiseptics un-

less he strictly adheres to his earliest suggestions. But psychoanalysis is not merely a science, it has become a religion. So, then, the English representative makes his debut in the "Internationale psychoanalytische Bibliothek" with his book on the treatment of the neuroses. To me this book seems to be the most superfluous piece of supererogation that has been thrown on the market in this period of analytical high-conjuncture. For the one who knows this work has nothing new, absolutely nothing. To the uninitiated it says too little. It contributes nothing even when the author attempts to treat objectively suggestion, hypnotism and other methods of treatment. It is hasty and superficial, perhaps of some value to the beginner who wishes to learn something about the various forms of treating the neuroses, even though the teachings are one-sided. These kinds of literature I would call "Satrap-literature"; epigonal they are not.

Stekel. (T.)

ADLER, DR. A.—*Praxis u. Theorie der Individual psychologie. Vortraege zur Einfuehrung in die Psychotherapie fuer Aertze, Psychologen u. Lehrer.* [The theory and practice of Individualistic psychology. Lectures for physicians, psychologists and teachers.] Munich (I. F. Bergmann), 1920; Royal 8vo, pp. 249; M.30.

The title of this book does not describe its contents. The work consists of a series (28) of old and new essays which

reproduce the author's now fairly generally known views. In Adler's teachings sexuality finds no place. Everything is referred to the dominating power of ambition, or, as he calls it, "the masculine protest." These teachings are a valuable complement to Freud's theories which have of late accepted the masculine protest idea although they have renamed it "the castration-complex." The newest phase of psychoanalysis stands in the sign of castration. Everything is to be explained as the reaction to the fear of being emasculated. Inasmuch as every person loves himself and is proud of his virility, every one fears to lose this virility. No doubt, this is to be found in some neurotics in a pronounced form but it by no means has the all-determining significance that Freud and his pupils attribute to it. Freud interprets Adler as imputing to women the idea "I don't want to be a woman" and to men the idea "I won't let myself be castrated"; but this is not what Adler means. Freud takes the "masculine protest" literally, whereas Adler's slogan is only a bad rendering for Nietzsche's "will for power."

Stekel. (T.)

BAUDOUIN, PROF. CH.—*Toilstoi: Educateur.*—Neucatel et Paris (Delachaux & Niestle), 1921.

Toilstoi as educator. Professor Baudouin gives us a clear and intelligible picture of the teachings of the great Russian philosopher-poet and substantiates his thesis by quotations from many

hitherto unknown documents. The book is to be recommended to all physicians who are interested in the important matter of pedagogy. It is one of the series of valuable works on pedagogy published in Geneva by the Institut Rousseau.

Stekel. (T.)

BOEHM, DR. J.—*Seelisches Erfuehlen: Telepathie u. raumliches Hellsehen.* [Telepathy and spatial clairvoyance], 1921.

There is no dearth of books on occultism. We are now being flooded with occultistic works and it is getting harder and harder to separate the wheat from the chaff. Dr. Boehm of Nuremberg, the founder of a medical association for the study of occult phenomena, presents us here with a series of objective observations on "telephathy" and "spatial clairvoyance." One is pleased with the calm presentation of the subject. Boehm gives us his experiments which really contain creditable and noteworthy material. I heartily concur with him when he says: "I hope that my material will be understood by and serve to dampen the gross materialism of philosophers, psychologists, physiologists, psychiatrists and ministers." This is modest and wholly justified. The existence of telepathic phenomena has nothing to do with occultism and it is sure to continue to be the possession of the spiritualists until the scientists take cognizance of its existence.

Stekel. (T.)

SILBERER, MR. H.—*Der Seelen-spiegel. Das enoptriche Moment im Okkultismus.* [The soul's mirror. The enoptric factor in Occultism.] Pfullingen (John Baum), 1921; 8 vo, wrappers, pp. 58.

It is a pleasure to find among the many publications on occultism offered us in the last few years to find one by such a cautious observer as Herbert Silberer is. This sterling oneirologist, who has given us many invaluable studies on dreams and dream psychology, offers us in this splendid little book proof that much that impresses us as being occultistic is really only a manifestation of unconscious psychic forces. Very aptly he says: "Ere we cast our eyes about and seek for remote wonders, let us not overlook what lies nearest us and let us seek within ourselves."

He introduces us to a large number of enoptric, or, as I prefer to call them, endopsychic phenomena. He shows us how the dream, as a mirror of the soul, reproduces a present situation and attempts to rise above it. He analyses for us in a masterly manner the phenomena of crystal gazing and other phenomena. We are not offered anything new in all this. In their studies of mediums and mediumship Flournoy and Jung have pointed out that these phenomena were the expression of unconscious forces, that, e.g., table rapping and automatic writing were only the dictation of the Unconscious. Hans Freimark (in *Psychische Studien*, Oct., 1921) represents the same point of view when he says: "What remains to be investigated is the source of the stimulus,

especially whether this does not lie, under certain circumstances, in the individual soul of the observer, but outside of this, in a psychic something common to all." Silberer's booklet shows that in these various manifestations the soul mirrors itself. "What you call the spirit of the worlds is the spirit of the master himself." Even though this be so, much that is wonderful remains, I believe that the wonders of the soul will be discovered in the next century when we shall learn of the tremendous power of the psyche.

Stekel. (T.)

MOREL, PROF. FERD.—*Essai sur l'Introversion mystique. Etude psychologique de Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite et de quelques autres cas de mysticisme.* [A Study of Mystic Introversion. A Psychological Study of Pseudo-Denys the Areopagite and of some other cases of mysticism.] Geneva (Librairie Kimdig), 1918.

Proceeding from the central phenomenon of introversion, the Swiss psychoanalyst, Ferdinand Morel, studies a number of mystics and their systems. In his very readable book, after a consideration of the theories of Charcot, Janet, Freud, Bleuler and Jung, and after elucidating the concepts of the *fonction du réel* (the reality function), the various stages of the *perte de l'adaptation*, of the reality- and pleasure-principle, of regression, of introversion and of autistic thinking with its unlimited possibilities, he postulates two opposite kinds of psychic activity: one coherent, directed, logical, and tending to a useful purpose with the

expenditure of effort—this is the *fonction du réel*; the other easy-going, convenient, self-surrendering, serving the gratification of a tendency, not fatiguing, tending towards the unconscious—this is "autistic thinking" or "*fonction de l'irréel*" (the unreality function). The unlimited possibilities of this second variety of "thinking" is of the utmost importance for the understanding of the psychology of mystics. Morel finds an additional basis for his work in H. Silberer's studies of symbolisms, especially in his differentiations of material and functional symbolism, which furnishes a guide to the speech imagery of mysticism.

One trait is common to all mystics: introversion. But not all introverted persons are mystics; we must rather assume a special kind of introversion which Morel calls (p. 27) "mystic introversion." The author's main object was the study of this form of introversion. To this internal study of the mystic very little is contributed by the historical, geographical and theological classification of mystics; the psycho-spiritual kinship of mystics to one another does not at all correspond to the groups set up on external resemblances. A psychological grouping would be desirable and the study now before us may serve to bring this about.—The pure type of introversion, with its absolutism, pursuing its course in a straightforward and direct line, impersonal, is called "*Introversion franche*" and is found strikingly developed in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite as well as in a few Alexandrian neo-platonists, in oriental systems,

but also in later occidental mystics. A more mixed, less radical type is frequently met with in Christian mystics.

Pseudo-Dionysius was a contemporary of Proclus [411?-485] but somewhat younger; he lived, therefore, about 500, in a period of general syncretism,—a period in which all sorts of intellectual and cultural movements flowed together in unheard of variety. He was an extreme case of absolute introversion, with the most extreme divergence from reality, although in a pre-eminently theoretical guises. In his language imagery, his complex of visions and his doctrine of the heavenly hierarchy Morel discovers an extremely auto-symbolic representation of the process of introversion. With the withdrawal of the psychic interest from all externals and the strivings connected with this there is an impoverishment of the symbolism of material phenomena and an augmentation of the functional symbols. The inmost psychic processes acquire an uncommonly affective actuality and portray themselves, i.e., their supremacy, in the ensuing visions. The withdrawal of oneself from without and from all the *contents* of consciousness, i.e., the centripetal process of introversion, acquires an especially large variety of representations.

Morel speaks (p. 108) of a "conscience fonctionnelle" (celle qui ne s'étend que notre fonctionnement actuel pur et simple) and of a "conscience matérielle" which contributes the external data, be they intellectual or sensuous. Mystic images depicting a gradual progression, a circling around a central point, play a large role. So too light that

shines in the darkness (p. 110). The ascent through the celestial hierarchy is, according to Morel, the introversion process. The lowest order of angels seem to correspond to a low degree of introversion; although they are turned towards God they deal with human affairs; in the middle order the introversion rises and attains its apex in the highest order of angels who bear God about in their role of theophori,—a bearing in whose concept there is a passive-feminine trait which is peculiar to many mystics. The ecstatic introjects himself into the God-like images in his vision. The latter, as a world system, is a projection, and in it too an introjection takes place: they are correlative processes (p. 82 ff.). An androgynous trait becomes apparent here, as well as an auto-erotic foundation.

The various upward or downward flights of the soul through the heavens must be interpreted in accordance with what we have said about the hierarchy of Dionysius. They occur in the most varied religious systems,—gnostic, apocalyptic, magical, alchemistic, cabalistic, and theosophical. "These symbols vary endlessly, but, for all that, they all express one and the same wish: an anticipation of the future life, an actual union with God; in the former we are dealing with something prophetic or eschatologic, in the latter mystical. In both are reflected only the various phases of a soul which has transformed itself in accordance with what it yearns for. Whether we call these different phases worlds or the sky, planets, spheres, cycles, stations, residences of the inner castle (as St. Theresa says), or an ascent to Mt.

Carmel (after St. John), the seven steps of the ladder of love (after Ruysbroeck) or, more exactly, as St. Bonaventura, the most didactic of the mystics, says: *itinerarium mentis ad Deum*. Are not all these the process of introversion?" (P. 74.)

At the portal of introversion stands the mystery of baptism, new birth, the acquisition of a new father by one's own choice; "rebirth" and "through death to life" govern the evolution. On p. 58 Morel quotes from Dieterich a Syrian baptismal liturgy in which the baptismal water is called a "womb for the procreation of a new being" and the "belly of a mother who bears immortal children." The old (natural) father represents reality, the new (chosen) one is a wish and leads to the "mother"; and in this childhood relationship the initiated are made brothers and members of a hermetically sealed circle of like-minded individuals." The practical requirements invade the symbolic.

Powerful projections of introversion therefore dominate the theology of Dionysius and spirits kindred to him, e.g., Proclus and Plotinus. God is endowed in accordance with an exquisite ego-centricity. Inasmuch as Dionysius created his system in his own edifying image, immediately out of his own (even though inner) experience, he is therefore a radical empiric and sensualist. His autosymbolism, pre-eminently functional, is the nucleus of his metaphysical system. Which is a *pratum felicitatis* of wish-fulfillments which lead away from realities.

In addition to the simple type of introversion which is to be found in other phenomena after the period of Dionysius,

there are, naturally, mixed types which betray matters of a more personal nature and show more color. This class of mystics Morel studies in the writings of Bernhard von Claivaux, Heinrich Seuse, Franz von Sales, Mme. Guyon, Antoinette Bourignon, Katherine of Siena and Margaret Ebner. In these more ordinary forms of mysticism various forms of erotism become more clearly manifest.

In a résumé the author attempts to determine the psychic prerequisites for the evolution of a mystic. He also gives points of differentiation between the two types; among other things, he says, the narcissism of the simple, direct type seems to be the more exclusive. In females Morel finds a less extensive regression than in male mystics; their sexuality suffers, on the whole, a slighter recession than that of the men who recede to narcissism exclusively. And the pole for which they strive, considering the decidedly bipolar character of the mystically evolving psyche, is not so far removed from consciousness as is the case in the men.

The metapsychologic in the metaphysical systems of thought, even in the non-mystical, is finally also emphasized, but we miss the caution that even though we prove the "metapsychic" origin of a system, it tells us nothing about its value, although it may seem to do so. In his, on the whole, valuable study, Morel has probably extended the compass of the introversion concept in the evolution of mysticism too far. See the role I assign to introversion in my book, "The Problems of Mysticism."

H. Silberer. (T.)

JACOBI.—Die Extase der alt-testamentarischen Propheten. [The extacy of the Prophets in the Old Testament.] Munich (I. F. Bergmann). 1920.

The nature of ecstasy has been too little studied as yet although it would serve to bring us nearer to an understanding of pathological psychic phenomena. We therefore welcome this book by Jacobi and gladly follow his guidance into the much-disputed territory of the psychic condition of the Prophets of the Old Testament. He goes at his task in a very thorough manner and is perfectly acquainted with all that's been written on the subject. He leads the Prophets in their ecstasies before us and compares them with the ecstasies of hysterics. Hallucinations, ecstatic speeches, ecstatic actions and visions are common to both types, so that we may regard the Prophets as religious hysterics, just as Jacobi regards the literary gift as a kind of "divine delusion."

I think that Jacobi does not take the nature of affectivity into sufficient consideration. We must regard these ecstasies as an affect-debauch with all the sequelae of a pathologically heightened affectivity: a narrowing of consciousness, a blindness for all other affects, a complete failure of the logical faculty, a sensitiveness to all sorts of stimuli, etc. We come across even what may be called normal examples of this sort of affect-debauch, approaching ecstasy, viz.: being in love, enthusiasm, inspiration, and religious zeal. All these states may rise to a degree of ecstasy. The lover writes impassioned forms dur-

ing his ecstasy, he becomes creative; the enthusiast is carried away to do things he would not dream of doing in his normal senses; the inspired writer becomes a real poet and the zealot may see an array of visions in his ecstasy.

It is, alas! too little known that most persons of our time suffer from affect-hunger. Many remarkable social phenomena are attributable to this emotion hunger which was so richly fed during the late war that occasionally apathy set in. But now we see on every hand a longing for ecstasies. The one-sidedness of ecstasy (Montegazza), the concentration upon one point, the heightened affectivity, is an alarming social phenomenon. The world is ripe again for a Prophet and I hear on every side the cry for a savior. Will it be a genuine or a false prophet? That will depend upon what success he meets with. Success makes a true prophet from a false one, as we see from the incredible success of "Christian Science" in America [and in England and Germany]. Ecstasies are often enough manifested in public gatherings.

There are important connecting links between religious ecstasies and various forms of mental disease. The "overvalued idea" (Wernicke) is often the carrier of a hidden ecstasy with a narrowing of consciousness. The finest examples of prophetic vision are to be found among paranoiacs. Their belief in their great historic mission breaks against the precipitous cliffs of reality and they seek refuge in the night of their delusions. But in their delusions I see only the effect of an enormous affect with a narrowing of consciousness.

Stekel. (T.)

KIRCHHOFF:—Die sexuellen Anomalien: ihr Wesen u. Entstehen nebst Grundzuegen einer Diagnose, Prognose u. Therapie unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Steinachschen Forschungen. [The sexual anomalies, their nature and origin, together with fundamentals of their diagnosis, prognosis and treatment, with special consideration of Steinach's investigations.] Frankfurt (O. Quass), 1921.

It was to be expected that therapeutics would take advantage of Steinach's researches, notwithstanding that so much in his teachings is hypothetical and dangerous. They are being assailed by many competent investigators. It is especially to be feared that we shall witness a furor operaticus with respect to homosexuals. Homosexuals have been cured before and after Steinach's work. It is known that I consider homosexuality a neurosis and am wholly in accord with Krepelin in his opposition to Hirschfeld's theory of congenital sexuality. It is therefore a pity that before this matter has been settled there should be publications promising a complete cure for homosexuals and perverts. Kirchhoff, for example, says: "The prospects of a cure have been enormously increased since the publication of Steinach's researches, and we are now in a position to say that *every sexual abnormality is curable*." I must confess that I am amazed at this unjustified and dangerous optimism. What justification have we for such optimism? Neither psychoanalysis nor the Steinach operation can cure every perversion. I have been studying this problem for twenty years,

and I know how difficult it is to cure perversions even though they are psychogenetic maladies. Kirchhoff credits psychoanalysis with the power to change one perversion into another and then into a hysterical symptom. I do not know whence he gets the knowledge; surely not from my books. I have reported faithfully my failures and my successes, but guarded against exaggerations. Every perversion is curable; more than that we cannot say. Kirchhoff admits not only the influence of the internal secretions but that psychic influences can regulate these secretions. I have always asserted that. But he goes too far when he says: "False symbols, fed by a normal sexual instinct, must, after a while, bring about organic changes, at first in the brain, then in the nerve tracts, and finally they must attack the instinct at its very root and thus directly influence the gonads." To me this is very nebulous and hypothetical.

For all that, we must credit this little book with a certain value. It is written in an animated style and, in a way, "a book of consolation for perverts." This is a mighty step forward for one who does not regard the destinies of perverts as an unalterable fate and is ready to attack them. But the book carries a danger with it which I cannot overlook. It describes much that is unsure as sure and thus makes it likely that the laity will become even more entangled in the neurotic net in which it finds itself. For popular scientific literature there ought to be a canon: from what is certain to what is most certain!

STEKEL. (T.)

SADGER, DR. J.—Friedrich Hebbel. Ein Psychoanalytischer Versuch. [F. Hebbel studied psychoanalytically.] Leipzig u. Wien (F. Deuticke), 1920.

A very industrious piece of work which attempts, by means of the now well-known psychoanalytic technique, to bring us to a clearer understanding of Hebbel the man. We are told nothing that is essentially new. But it will offer much that is interesting and stimulating to those who are interested in this genial poet.

STEKEL. (T.)

SILBERER, MR. H.—Der Zufall u. die Koboldstreiche des Unbewussten. [Chance and the antics of the Unconscious.] Bern-Leipzig (E. Bircher Verlag), 1921, pp. 72.

A delightful and well-written book which amusingly and instructively illuminates the problems of chance and accident. It is at the same time a splendid introduction to the study of unconscious phenomena. Also discusses the psychology of gambling and of fate.

STEKEL. (T.)

MUELLER.—Bismarck, Nietzsche, Scheffel, Mörike. Der Einfluss nervöser Leiden auf ihr Leben u. Schaffen. [The influence of their nervous maladies on the lives and works of Bismarck, etc.] Bonn (A. Marcus & Weber), 1921.

We expect more from this book than we get. The work lacks analytical depth or profundity in dealing with its materials. It is an industrious piece of work and is especially thorough in its

treatment of Nietzsche whose malady is attributed essentially to overwork. Throughout the work one catches glimpses of the old concepts of the neuroses. The author has no conception of the psychic conflicts underlying these afflictions. For aught that appears to the contrary, this book might have been written twenty years ago.

STEKEL. (T.)

STAERCKE, DR. A.:—Der Kastrations Komplex. ([The Castration complex.] Internat. Zeitsch. f. Ps., vol. VII, No. 1.

SADGER:—Die Lehre von der Geschlechtsverirrungen [Psychopathia sexualis] auf psa. Grundlage. [Sexual perversions studied psychoanalytically.] Wien: Fr. Deuticke, 1921.

Anxious to be instructed on the subject of this mysterious castration complex, I greedily snatch at the work of Staercke and the stout volume by Sadger. Staercke is a clever, brilliant, but fantastic thinker. He and Groddeck may be said to represent the left-wing of the Freudians. He finds the castration-complex in everybody and attributes it to the trauma of having been weaned from the mother's breast. This harmful but necessary weaning acts upon boys and girls as a castration. He says, literally: "The connection between the incest-fantasy and the castration-complex is as follows: my penis disappears in my mother, i. e., my nipple (i. e. the mammary nipple in my mouth) is lost in my mother." Not to do this learned author

an injustice I shall quote his final words and leave the reader to do his own thinking on the matter. He says: "In all philosophies of life one finds the wish to undo the separation between the ego and the outer world. We speak of the necessary syntheses between the macrocosm and the microsm, of life in harmony with the infinite, of the feeling of being at one with nature, and these are called conditions essential to happiness. This happiness, which all wish, is bound to primary narcissism and autoerotism. In this the fundamentals are sucking, defecating and urinating. But in this triumvirate the mammary nipple has the leadership, and thus it happens that the breast (as the mother) becomes the fundamental concept for the outer world and that the yearning for re-union appertains to her, whereas the nipple (in the form of its subsequent representative, viz.: the penis) becomes the centre of the personality of the ego, so that an injury to it is regarded as a serious injury to the ego. It is this separation from the primary-ego, the formation of the environment, which is the primary castration, and when I applied the term to the weaning process I was only using that as a metaphor for this separation."

And this appeared in the year 1921 in what pretends to be a German scientific journal! The reader must not think, however, that I underestimate the significance of the castration [threat] for the psychic life of the neurotic. I have been for years seeking for this complex with the analytic lantern and have found it now and then, but only

now and then. It is possible I have not made a very careful search. If so, Sadger's heavy volume on the new sexual pathology will instruct me.

As I read this book I realize that I have been a very poor diagnostician and how often I have brushed by the castration complex without knowing it. According to Sadger the diagnosis is easily made if (I quote him literally): "if a child bites its mother while it is nursing, if it tears off the arms and legs of its dolls, if a woman eats sausages, if an older sister snatches her younger brother's toys from him, if a man beheads flowers with his cane." Equally significant and give-away is it to break matches, toothpicks and the tips of cigars, to tear flowers out of the ground, to bite one's nails, to urinate on benches, pillars. Many who lost a limb during the world war are happy because they have thus paid for their sins by a substitute castration. Antisemitism is a certain sign of a fear of castration. All girls suffer from this fear because they appear in their own eyes as castrated boys. Now I shall quote Sadger literally again: "Girls reproach their mothers as long as they live for having brought them into the world castrated, and as soon as they develop a sexual desire for their fathers, and with it a consciousness of guilt, they think that they were punished with emasculation because of their sinful desire. We see here that the thought of castration becomes pathogenic only when it becomes involved in the Oedipus-complex."

Enough of quotations! The book is throughout in this vein. And this kind of

stuff is being printed and presented to our young medicos as the latest science and as tremendous progress. These teachings about sexual aberrations only teach us the hideous absurdities of the psychoanalysts and serve to make all analytic truths mere caricature and farce. Freud has stoutly defended the use of the term "Oedipus-complex" even with reference to a girl's love for her father although Jung had suggested that this phenomenon should be known as the "Electra-complex."

With the assistance of the castration-complex every girl becomes a little Oedipus. All we need now is a Sophocles to rewrite the drama from this point of view.

Stekel. (T.)

ABRAHAM, DR. K.:—*Klinische Beiträge zur Psa.* [Clinical Contributions

to Psa.] Wien: Internat. Psa. Press, 1921; Royal 8 vo. pp. 301; 28 essays.

In contrast to Sadger, Abraham represents the moderate wing of the psychoanalysts. His volume of collected essays contains a number of valuable additions to *psa*. I consider his essay on the earliest, the pregenital stage of the libido a really valuable contribution. Others of his theses show the restricted horizon of the orthodox Freudian. In all of them there is a sound kernel, but they degenerate and become farcical when they terminate, as they all do, in attributing all the symptoms to the overworked "complexes." Analysis is in great need of reform. But time will surely accomplish this and select what of this rapidly growing literature is going to survive.

Stekel. (T.)

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